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Abstract 
 
Since the Mexican crisis in 1994/95, a large number of developing countries and emerging 
markets have been hit by financial crises. Argentina is the last country that is suffering from 
dramatic economic problems. The main cause of these crises are the deregulation and 
liberalisation of financial markets that have been associated with the current model of 
globalisation. This model is not sustainable: Is has contributed to massive economic problems 
in the developing world without providing the promised rewards in form of higher growth and 
reduced poverty. 
 
In this paper, the three main areas that influence the shape of financial markets are discussed 
and improvements are suggested: Firstly the exchange rate regimes of developing countries, 
secondly the shape of international credit markets and the asymmetric relationship between 
creditors and lenders and thirdly the main institution that provides partial governance, i.e. the 
International Monetary Fund.  
 
International financial markets have gained in importance, but they still lack many of the 
features that characterises the national financial sector. If globalisation shall be continued, we 
need those governance structures, e.g. a lender of last resort, at the international level.  
 
The reform agenda suggested in this paper is comprehensive, but rather evolutionary. Markets 
need rules and regulations, and today these are often not existent at the international level.  
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1.  Introduction: Why regulate? 
The financial crises of the past eight years have intensified the debate on a new international 
financial architecture. Since the Mexican crisis in 1994 and 1995 the financial markets have 
frequently been hit by severe crises. Since 1945 there has been no decade with as many 
financial crises as the 1990s. The turmoil also affected countries which were, prior to the 
crisis, considered to be model pupils. 
 
The Asian crisis was particularly striking. That crisis was not limited to one economy, but 
affected an entire region. Furthermore, there were virtually no warnings in advance. Both this 
inability to forecast and the dimension of the biggest economic crisis since World War II (Bill 
Clinton) have caused concern. But since 1998 several other financial crises hit developing and 
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transformation countries. The crisis in Russia in 1998, the Brazilian crisis in 1999, the Turkish 
crisis in 2001 and finally the default of Argentina show that financial markets are 
characterised by frequent instability. The Argentinean case in particular demonstrates the risks 
associated with the implementation of a currency board, a system staunchly defended by the 
International Monetary Fund in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.  
 
For developing countries the volatility of capital flows is a particularly worrying aspect. While 
in 1996 more than $ 230 billion of private capital (net) was flowing to developing countries 
and emerging markets, in 2000 these flows were reduced to a mere $ 0.5 billion. Even more 
problematic is the development of bank credit. In 1996, the net flow of private bank credit to 
all developing countries was $ 26.7 billion (net), in 2000 there was a net outflow of $ 148.3 
billion (see Table 1). In 1997 and 1998, public inflows partly filled the gap. 
 
Table 1: Capital Flows to Developing Countries and Emerging Markets 
1993 to 2002 (billions of US-Dollar) 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Private capital, net 139.1 147.5 205.5 234.4 119.1 69.1 58.6 0.5 -1.4 71.0 
Direct investment, net 57.6 81.4 97.5 120.0 145.8 155.9 153.1 147.3 162.7 158.2 
Portfolio investment, net 87.6 112.8 43.8 87.8 48.1 -2.0 31.7 1.5 -0.2 24.0 
Bank credit,  
net 
-6.1 -46.8 64.2 26.7 -74.8 -84.9 -126.2 -148.3 -163.9 -111.2 
Public capital flows, net 50.3 5.5 24.1 0.1 62.2 55.4 9.5 1.4 19.6 -3.5 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2001, p. 9. Data for 2001 and 2002 are estimates        
of the  IMF. A minus indicates an outflow of capital.  
 
For developing countries and emerging markets, these trends are problematic. These 
difficulties are not only caused by outflows of capital. In the event of substantial capital 
inflows these often contribute to an unwanted overheating of the economy. After the 
dismantling of capital controls in many developing countries and emerging markets, the 
central banks of these countries are confronted with a dilemma. To reduce the trend towards 
overheating, the central bank ought to raise interest rates. In the absence of capital controls the 
rise of interest rates in an emerging market frequently encourages banks and companies to 
increase their borrowing abroad. This in turn increases the vulnerability of the entire economy 
in the event of a change in sentiment, i.e. when lenders abruptly stop rolling over existing 
debt. 
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However, the reversal of capital flows to an emerging market is the more dramatic event. For 
banks, companies and the government a massive reversal of capital flows represents a task 
that is hard to shoulder. In such a situation the short maturities of loans, chosen because of 
lower interest rates on short-term credit, backfire. Entire economies can be forced to repay a 
substantial part of their foreign debt within weeks. In the event of instability, private lenders 
tend to panic and thereby they put fuel into the fire. Once the fire is lit, both lenders and 
investors tend to rush to the exit at the same time. It should be noted that such a panic also 
puts enormous pressure on the exchange rate. If domestic borrowers are forced to repay their 
loans, most of the time denominated in foreign currency, the dramatically rising demand for 
foreign exchange forces the central bank, in the case of fixed rates, to use its foreign reserves 
In the case of flexible rates it directly weakens the exchange rate. 
 
The development of such a situation is partly the responsibility of the OECD-countries. In the 
Basle Accord of 1988, short-term interbank credit was given a risk factor of only 20 percent 
(see Nunnenkamp 2001, p. 24). In other words: The regulation of banks in OECD-countries 
encouraged interbank lending on a short-term basis and discouraged long-term credit. Volatile 
short-term flows were given a preference, whilst those types of capital flows that are least 
problematic for a developing country were made more costly.  
 
These developments are somewhat surprising. The supporters of a comprehensive 
liberalisation of financial markets had promised a different result. The liberalisation of capital 
markets should have led to substantial advantages for developing countries. The cost of 
financing an investment in a developing country should have been lower due to the use of 
cheap foreign savings. The competitiveness of companies should have risen. Instead, what we 
witness is at best a mixed blessing. Phases of higher efficiency are followed by periods of 
financial crises. On balance, the cost of this liberalised system to developing countries appear 
to be higher than the benefit. This assessment is underlined when the reversal of capital flows 
to all developing countries and emerging markets is considered: These economies do not get 
the capital they need, yet they suffer from the disadvantages of liberalised financial markets 
(see Table 1). 
 
It is necessary to make a differentiation. There are different types of capital flows with 
differing levels of risk. The most problematic capital flows are foreign credits with a short 
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maturity. Significantly less risky are foreign credits with a maturity of several years as well as 
foreign direct investment (see Griffith-Jones 1998, p. 38f). The latter category in particular 
has shown very little volatility over the last years. From 1993 to 2002, foreign direct 
investment to all developing countries has risen steadily and has never been affected by a 
sharp decline (see Table 1). 
 
When financial crises in developing countries and emerging markets are analysed, the 
argument that these crises are the result of mistakes of domestic economic policy is used 
frequently. For instance, the former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Stanley 
Fischer, characterised the Asian crisis as ”mainly homegrown”. Without a doubt, domestic 
economic policy always contributes to a currency and credit crisis. But these mistakes are less 
relevant than the faults of international financial markets. If domestic economic policy were 
the prime cause for trouble, one would have to ask why the same economic policy was 
responsible for the preceding economic boom. The financial crisis of the last years have 
mainly affected economies that had enjoyed long periods of economic prosperity prior to the 
crash. 
 
The Asian crisis in particular falls into this category. Before 1997 very few observers very 
questioning the solidity and sustainability of the economic boom that Southeast and East Asia 
had been enjoying for many years. If these voices existed at all, they were limited to academic 
circles. But even there virtually nobody can claim to have forecasted the Asian crisis. 
However, financial markets were even more naive. Although it is easy to identify warning 
signals, at least with the benefit of hindsight, markets did not take notice. As late as spring 
1997 optimism dominated. Banks were eager to lend to Asian borrowers. When the tide 
turned, however, virtually all creditors tried to limit their exposure at the same time. 
Yesterday’s winners were today’s losers. The same reasons that were given for the rapid 
economic rise of Asian countries were now claimed to be the reasons for the crisis.  
 
A particular point was the judgement  that so called crony capitalism was the source of the 
crisis. Before 1997, the close relationship between banks and borrowers was 
identifiedconsidered to be particularly efficient. In the crisis this relationship suddenly was 
given as one of the prime reasons for the crisis. But crony capitalism is neither the main 
reason for the rise of Asian economies nor for their decline. Furthermore, crony capitalism is a 
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phenomenon that is not limited to the developing world. The case of Enron as well as the 
collapse of the state-owned Landesbank Berlin are recent examples for crony capitalism in 
supposedly well-regulated developed economies.  
 
It is appropriate to compare the wisdom of investors in Asia with the intelligence of investors 
that created the internet bubble in share markets. In both cases early warning signals could 
have been seen. Investors did not consider rational forecasts, but rather fuelled a widespread 
mania. Many investors in internet shares wished they had never touched that market. 
 
However, despite similar blind euphoria in both cases, an important difference remains: The 
bursting of the internet bubble has resulted in a loss of paper fortunes, but it has not caused 
real economic harm. Quite the opposite happens in financial crises in developing countries: 
After those bubbles burst, the result often is mass unemployment, and in some case, for 
instance Indonesia, even hunger crises and the collapse of state authority. 
 
The prominent role that public money had to play in the solution of problems that have been 
created by private players has frequently and rightly been criticised. When private borrowers 
and private lenders have caused a financial crisis, it is neither logical nor acceptable that 
public funds are used for bailing-out private risk-takers. For that is what they ought to do: 
Take a risk, and make a profit, or, sometimes, a loss. The current financial architecture lacks 
structures that force private lenders to face the consequences of their activities. The 
international financial system needs incentives and rules for the private solution of private 
debt crises.  
 
A further problem is the asymmetry in international financial relations. Developing countries 
and emerging markets have been forced to open their own economy both for imports from 
OECD-countries as well as for banks and other providers of financial services. At the same 
time, the markets of OECD-countries remains closed precisely in those areas where 
developing countries are competitive. The most prominent example is the agricultural sector 
of most OECD-countries. The former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, 
rightly accuses the United States of having been the major force in the opening of financial 
sectors because of the competitiveness of its own industry in that field (see. Stiglitz 2001). 
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The proposals for a re-regulation of international financial markets that I will discuss focus on 
the creation of a global regime for these markets. A solid framework for these markets is the 
aim. In national financial markets we do have these conditions since many years. All national 
financial markets of OECD-countries are highly regulated. For instance, there are detailed 
procedures in the event of a bankruptcy of a borrower. In national markets, no lender can 
escape his obligations and has to contribute to the orderly solution of a bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, national financial systems do have a powerful lender-of-last-resort, the central 
bank. In the event of a crisis, these lenders-of-last-resort provide the financial sector with its 
essential fuel, liquidity.1  
 
Developing countries and emerging markets do not have access to those instruments. They do 
not have developed, deep financial markets. Therefore companies have to borrow abroad for 
financing of investment. But the current system does not provide these countries with 
sufficient support in the event of a crisis. Rather the contrary: In the past, financial crises were 
often abused. Countries had to implement measures that were in the interest of the financial 
industry of OECD-countries, but against the interest if the affected developing country.  
 
The recent debate on the Tobin tax has shown that those responsible for shaping globalisation 
have not made their job properly. Promoting globalisation carries a big obligation with it. The 
increasing integrated global economy needs global rules and regulations. Policy makers have 
to realise that behind the calls for a Tobin tax stands the recognition that governments have 
promised a lot immediately after financial crises, but have delivered very little so far.  
 
After the most recent financial crises even representatives of the financial sector called for 
government intervention. The provision of rules and regulations is a task for governments, not 
for the private sector. The chief economist of Deutsche Bank, Norbert Walter, called the 
provision of rules and regulations for international financial markets a duty of national 
governments. One could also describe the provision of a framework for international financial 
markets as a global public good. A stable international financial system is characterised by 
                                                 
1  A good example for the function of the large central banks is their reaction after September 11. Both the 
American Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank provided markets with liquidity. On September 11, 
the Fed helped financial markets with $ 80 billion of liquidity, which were supplied through both the discount 
window of the Fed and open markets operations. The ECB supported the Fed’s efforts by supplying Euro 69.3 
billion on September 12 and a further Euro 40.5 billion on September 13 (see The Financial Times, 1 October 
2001, p. 2). 
 10
both non-rivalry and non-excludability: Consumption of this good does not reduce its 
availability for other countries; and no country can be excluded from using that public good. It 
can only be provided by the collective effort of national governments, yet the non-provision 
causes costs for all players, both private and public, in all countries. A stable international 
financial system would be a benefit to all economies. However, although virtually all 
countries would benefit, the stabilisation of the international financial system also creates 
losers. Those that are currently making a profit from either speculation or from providing 
insurance against speculation would suffer, and these players are resisting change in the 
system. Although this applies primarily for the foreign exchange markets, similar points can 
be made with regard to the credit markets. 
 
It should not be forgotten that today’s liberal economic order has not been created by market 
processes  without decisive influence of public actors. Quite the opposite: A coalition of 
public and private players have jointly pressed for the liberalisation of financial markets. The 
creation of global financial markets was the strategy of an alliance of players. Private 
preferences for liberalised markets were transformed into government policies for the 
dismantling of barriers for financial markets (see Underhill 2001). 
 
In comparison to the system of Bretton Woods, operational from 1945 to 1971, today’s system 
reflects a change of priorities. In the Bretton Woods system, the interests of the financial 
sector were subordinated under the wider interest of societies for a stable development of the 
economy. Also, the experiences with unregulated markets in the 1920s were still sufficiently 
well-remembered to encourage policy makers to limit the power of financial markets. In other 
words: The liberalisation of financial markets from the beginning of the 1970s was not only a 
push for more efficiency of the financial sector, but is also reflected the increased political 
influence of the financial sector and a declining interest in a steady development of the entire 
economy.  
 
The reform of the international financial system should reach the three following goals: a) 
Both the frequency and the depth of financial crises should be reduced. b) Creditors should 
systematically be integrated in both crisis prevention and in the solution of crises. c) The 
financial sectors of developing countries have to be strengthened in order to reduce the need 
for borrowing abroad.  
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Reaching those goals would make a contribution to the development of a more stable and 
more just world economy. If this stabilisation is not achieved, the current liberal economic 
order might be at risk. Similar to the developments that followed the Great Depression much 
more than financial markets could be at risk. Countries may decide to isolate their economies 
from the world market. The collapse of the multilateral trading order may be the consequence. 
If financial markets are not providing the benefits that the proponents have been promising, 
the retreat from the global economy appears to be possible. The recent reactions that followed 
the collapse of Argentina give an indication: The discussion may have already begun.   
 
As long as seven years ago, after the Mexican crisis, prominent economists already asked 
whether the liberalisation of the international financial markets has gone too far. In particular, 
both the speed and the scope of liberalisation were criticised. The risk identified was a 
backlash that could also affect world trade, a far more important field (see Griffith-Jones 
1998, p. 188). 
 
In this paper I do not intend to propose a grand strategy for the re-regulation of international 
financial markets. Instead, I am looking at a number of specific proposals that can make a 
contribution towards more stable financial markets. Firstly, I am discussing a proposal for a 
tax on currency transactions, the so-called Tobin tax. Secondly, I am looking at the current 
discussion on currency regimes. Both a rigid currency board, applied in Argentina, as well as a 
totally flexible exchange rate regime, used in South Africa, display major weaknesses. The 
currency board contributed to Argentina’s drift into economic depression. But completely 
flexible rates are no alternative either, as the case of South Africa shows. For developing 
countries and emerging markets, the discussion on the appropriate exchange rate regime will 
gain fresh momentum after the Argentinean crisis. Dollarisation, intermediate regimes and 
monetary regionalism are the options available to those countries.   
 
Thirdly, I will look at measures that force lenders to participate both in crisis prevention and 
crisis resolution. The current order has neglected these issues. The risk management of private 
lenders has frequently been insufficient. Even more problematic is the fact that private lenders 
could try to avoid making a contribution toward the resolution of a financial crisis in a 
developing country. Both rollover-options and collective action clauses in bond issues can 
make a contribution towards reaching these goals.  
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Fourthly, I will look at two institutions that are of utmost importance for the international 
financial markets, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF). Although the IMF continues to be the single most important institution that governs 
financial market regulation, the FSF might play an important role in the future: It appears to 
be easier to discuss financial market regulation in smaller circles before proposing them in the 
IMF. I will also discuss the question whether the IMF should be transformed into a global 
lender-of-last-resort.  
 
2.  TOBIN TAX AND SPAHN TAX: POWERFUL TOOLS OR A NUISANCE? 
 
In recent months, an old proposal by James Tobin has been making the headlines again. Many 
critics of globalisation hope that the introduction of a Tobin tax would solve two problems at 
the same time: The tax would stabilise exchange rates and simultaneously provide a source for 
financing development in the South.  
 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, Tobin had suggested a small tax on currency 
transactions. The idea was to make speculation against currencies less attractive by increasing 
transaction costs. Tobin's proposal is based on earlier suggestions by John Maynard Keynes, 
who had advocated the use of taxes for the stabilisation of financial markets. In 2001 both the 
French and the German heads of government supported the careful evaluation of the 
instrument. Numerous non-governmental organisation, amongst them WEED in Germany and 
ATTAC, have made the introduction of the Tobin tax a central element of their reform 
proposals. Despite the widespread support that the Tobin tax enjoys, it does not appear to be 
an instrument that can provide the expected results.  
 
The central weakness of the Tobin tax is that all international movements of capital are 
implicitly considered harmful. Thousands of useful and entirely harmless transactions are put 
into the same category with destructive speculative movements of capital (see Flassbeck/Noé 
2001, p. 1367). This is unnecessary and leads to additional cost that negatively affects 
international trade. The argument that such a small tax will not harm trade is not convincing 
when taking today’s mode of transnational production into consideration. A product and the 
associated payments will cross the borders of national economies a few times before the end 
product reaches the customer. Therefore, a Tobin tax would have a cumulative effect. 
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Furthermore, doubts remain whether the Tobin tax can reach its primary goal, i.e. the 
avoidance of severe currency crises. Speculators that wish to attack an exchange rate will not 
be discouraged by a tax of 0.1 to 0.25 percent. When profits of 30 percent and more are 
expected, such a small tax does not have any effect (see Nunnenkamp 2001, p. 16; 
Frenkel/Menkhoff 2000, p. 66). Two recently published studies by the European Commission 
and the German Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development come to the same 
conclusion. The main goal, the stabilisation of exchange rates, will not be achievable with the 
Tobin tax (see Commission of the European Communities 2002, p. 44; Spahn 2002, p. 4).  
 
On a more general level, it is not clear whether raising transactions costs is a powerful 
instrument against speculation. For example, consider real estate markets. Transaction costs 
vary from country to country, but they are quite high everywhere. According to the logic of 
the Tobin tax, real estate markets should be characterised by very few speculative excesses. 
There is no empirical evidence that supports such a judgement (see Shiller 2000, p. 227). 
 
Stock exchanges with higher transaction costs do also not show any signs of greater stability 
compared to exchanges with lower transactions costs (see Shiller 2001, p. 227). An example 
for a stock exchange with relatively high transactions costs is, surprisingly, the London Stock 
Exchange. Since 1694 the government collects a so-called stamp duty at a rate of 0.5 percent, 
to be paid by the buyer of a share. This transaction tax today is the oldest tax collected in the 
United Kingdom. The revenue from this form of taxation are considerable. In the fiscal year 
1999-2000, the British Treasurer collected more than Euro 5 billion from this stamp duty. 
This is a fourfold increase from 1994-1995. Despite the relatively high level of taxation, the 
London Stock Exchange has been as volatile as any other exchange in Europe. The reduction 
of speculation cannot be demonstrated with this example.2 
 
The Tobin tax, however, would do harm to those that bet on small movements of the 
exchange rate. But these small movements are not a problem. They do not cause harm for the 
real economy. And they are not easily dispensable. This arbitrage function secures uniform 
prices and provides liquid markets. A Tobin tax could eventually even have destabilising 
effects for exchange markets. A reduction of the level of liquidity by reducing turnover can 
                                                 
2 Not surprisingly, there is a movement that calls for the abolition of the stamp duty. See their homepage at 
www.StampOutStampDuty.co.uk.  
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rise the volatility of exchange markets (see Paqué 2001). This is particularly so in the case of 
developing countries, where turnover is quite low already (see Commission of the European 
Communities 2002, p. 44). A current example for the negative consequences of the reduction 
of liquidity in exchange markets is the South African case: In October 2001 the South African 
government wanted to curb speculation against the rand and introduced measures to limit the 
trade in foreign exchange. These measures contributed to the collapse of the exchange rate 
towards the end of 2001 (see also the chapter on exchange rate regimes).  
 
Finally, it cannot be ignored that the successful implementation of a Tobin tax probably 
requires its world-wide introduction. Even if just one financial centre in every time zone 
would not participate, this could result in a cost disadvantage for the other financial centres 
that would have the Tobin tax. In the medium and long run, this could lead to a relocation of 
currency trade to those financial centres that would note participate in the collection of the 
Tobin tax.  
 
A Tobin tax, that shall be collected in a sustainable way, i.e. without creating incentives for 
the relocation of currency trade, requires a multilateral approach. It would have to be collected 
at least in all major financial centres. Therefore the question has to asked whether it is 
plausible to expect US participation in the near future. Without the Americans such a concept 
does not make sense. At this point in time, however, American participation appears to be 
very unlikely. September 11 did not change the unwillingness of the American government to 
regulate markets, apart from their demonstrated readiness to subsidise their own industries and 
punish successfully restructured steel companies with the introduction of protectionist 
measures. But in financial markets, the American preference for entirely unregulated markets 
persists.3 
 
However, some reservations have to be made. The experience of the financial markets in 
London have shown that the stamp duty has not resulted in a reduction of London's 
importance as a financial centre. The stamp duty has neither reduced volatility in the market 
nor has it contributed to the departure of financial sector companies. A Tobin tax that would 
only be levied in one part of the world would probably not lead to the immediate relocation of 
                                                 
3 A minor exception is the campaign against money laundering. But this is only a small  element of financial 
sector regulation and should mainly be seen as a contribution to the fight against terrorism. 
 15
currency trading to other parts of the world. If the European Union would impose that tax at a 
low rate and the USA would not, the Tobin tax would not change much. Currency markets 
would not be stabilised, but the Tobin tax would not do much harm to European currency 
trading either. The main point here is the level of taxation: The higher the tax rate, the greater 
the risk that relocation of currency trading will eventually occur.  
 
Although there are both conceptual and political reasons for questioning the usefulness of a 
Tobin tax, the debate about it is nevertheless beneficial. Governments do have a responsibility 
for shaping globalisation and for the order of financial markets in particular. Globalisation has 
not led to powerless governments. Rather, policy makers have for a long time ignored their 
responsibility for the regulation of markets and have hoped for their self-regulation. The 
growing resistance against unregulated and liberalised financial markets and also the debate 
on the Tobin tax may encourage the governments in OECD-countries to carefully evaluate the 
economic and political advantages of improved regulation.  
 
On the other hand, the debate on the Tobin tax may also have exactly the opposite effect. The 
debate distracts attention from the real problems of international financial markets and the 
willingness to consider complex economic problems might be reduced (see Flassbeck/Noé 
2001, p. 1368). This danger is evident both in policy making circles and in the anti-
globalisation movement. The temptation appears to be high: By imposing a Tobin tax ist 
supporters hope to achieve both the stabilisation of financial markets and to gain a massive 
source for the financing of development. Miraculously two of the most pressing problems of 
the global economy will be solved at the same time. Unfortunately, neither will be achieved 
with a Tobin tax. Without going into a detailed discussion I would like to point out that other 
instruments, e.g. on aviation fuel, appear to be far more realistic: they promise to provide a 
stable flow of money and can be implemented much more easily (see Commission of the 
European Communities 2002, p. 91).4 
 
Finally one has to take into consideration that the introduction of the Tobin tax would be the 
model case for the re-regulation of international financial markets. With the Tobin tax the 
attempt would be made to regulate financial markets much more than in the past. Therefore 
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the proposal for a Tobin tax carries a particular burden. If the Europe-wide or even the world-
wide introduction of a Tobin tax would not generate the expected results, both with regard to 
stabilisation and to providing money for financing development, the Tobin tax would have 
caused more harm than good, because the re-regulation of financial markets would have been 
discredited. 
 
In view of the substantial weaknesses the Tobin tax shows in its original form, modified 
variations have been proposed. Paul Bernd Spahn has suggested a two-tiered tax. The first 
level would cover all currency transactions and would be exactly like the original Tobin tax 
with one difference: The tax rate should be extremely low, i.e. between 0.005 and 0.02 
percent. This part of the tax would only provide some revenue. The stabilisation of exchange 
rates shall be achieved with the second tier. The idea of Spahn is that a country first of all has 
its exchange rate float within a pre-defined exchange rate band. Around the central exchange 
rate, administratively set, the exchange can fluctuate freely within a band of, say, + 3 percent. 
Outside this exchange rate corridor a high tax of between 50 and 100 percent would apply (see 
Spahn 2002, p. 21-28). This tax should be implemented unilaterally by all those 
transformation countries, developing countries and emerging markets that wish to stabilise 
their exchange rate (see Spahn 2002, p. 27).  
 
Spahn appears to have made a very convincing proposal. Both aims of the Tobin tax, the 
stabilisation of exchange rates and the generation of revenue, appear to be achievable. The 
ability to implement it unilaterally, i.e. without consent of the USA or the IMF, is another 
major advantage. However, as often, if something looks too good to be true it probably is. The 
Spahn tax requires preconditions which, if provided, will make the implementation of the 
Spahn tax unnecessary.  
 
The critical point is the spatial reach of the tax. The currency of any country is not only traded 
in its own financial markets, but also in other financial markets and, quite important, in 
offshore financial centres. To avoid that currencies are affected by speculative attack, one 
would have to limit the trade of the currency to those financial markets that can be reach by a 
country's jurisdiction. These are only the country's own financial markets. Only there the 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 However, even a fuel tax collected within the European Union would create certain problems, e.g. the treatment 
of aircraft flying to intercontinental destinations: If the tax were too high, there would be an incentive to refuel 
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Spahn tax can be levied. In other financial markets and in particular in offshore financial 
centres the implementation of the tax requires the consent of the authorities in charge for those 
markets. It is hard to see why, say, the British authorities should implement a tax in London 
that is used for the stabilisation of the Brazilian Real. And it is even more farfetched to expect 
that from an offshore financial centre. The consequence is that for the successful 
implementation of the Spahn tax one would need capital controls. But if a country implements 
capital controls, it does not need a Spahn tax, because capital controls as such offer a 
sufficient protection against speculation. In other words: Without capital controls, the Spahn 
tax would not work, and with capital controls it would not be required. 
 
Considering these limitations, one could also imagine that a Spahn tax ought to be levied by 
those companies that operate as clearing houses for international currency trade. But the 
problem again is that this would be beyond the jurisdiction of a given country. A private 
company registered in a third country cannot be forced to levy the tax of the country that 
wants to stabilise its exchange rate. Even if the clearing house could be forced to do so, this 
would only create an incentive to establish a competing company, with a differing legal 
construction, to be set up in order to avoid the Spahn tax.  
 
The bottom line is: Neither the Tobin tax nor its modified version, the Spahn tax, can 
contribute to the stabilisation of exchange markets. Consequently, it has to be asked in which 
way developing countries and emerging markets can stabilise their exchange rates. This 
question has gained further importance after the collapse of the Argentinean currency board. 
 
3.  EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES: IS THE BIPOLAR VIEW CORRECT? 
 
The dramatic economic crisis in Argentina has refocused our attention to the issue of 
exchange rate regimes. In 1991, Argentina had pegged its exchange rate to the US-Dollar at a 
rate of one to one. The instrument used was a currency board. After initial success the 
Argentinean economic policy ran into a deadlock from 1998 on. The exchange rate regime did 
not permit an adjustment to the new economic circumstances that had been dramatically 
changed by the Asian crisis and the devaluation the Brazilian real. Needless to say that the 
exchange rate regime was not the only cause of Argentina's catastrophic economic situation, 
                                                                                                                                                        
the aircraft just outside the EU. 
 18
but the inflexibility of this currency regime has impeded an appropriate response to the 
external shocks caused by the Asian and the Brazilian crisis. 
 
After the financial crises of the 1990s, the International Monetary Fund and prominent 
economists have suggested that developing countries and emerging markets should choose 
between two corner solutions: They should either opt for a currency board or for a flexible 
exchange rate. All intermediate exchange rate regimes were dismissed as being too risky. In 
2002, this bipolar view itself now has to be re-examined.   
 
The reason is not only the trouble in Argentina. The other corner solution, a fully flexible 
exchange rate, has proven to be very dangerous for advanced developing countries as 
demonstrated by the South African case. From 2 August 2001 to 2 January 2002 the Rand fell 
vis-à-vis the Euro from 7.2 Rand per Euro to 11.1 Rand per Euro.5 The Rand lost more than 
half of its value against the Euro and the Dollar without a plausible economic explanation. 
The macroeconomic data of South Africa do not provide a cause for the devaluation of the 
Rand. However, the consequences of a devaluation of this magnitude are substantial. To name 
just two consequences: The service of debt denominated in foreign currency is becoming 
much more burdensome and the risk of a so-called imported inflation rises dramatically. 
 
Both corner solutions show substantial weaknesses. If these exchange rate regimes are 
difficult to implement, it has to be asked which options remain for economic policy in a 
developing country. Three solutions will be considered: Firstly, developing countries can 
forego the right to have an own currency and can use the money of another country. This can 
be dollarisation or euroisation. Secondly, countries can select intermediate regimes between a 
hard peg and a flexible rate. This is the main recommendation of a recent proposal of the 
OECD: "Don't fix, don't float" is the programmatic title of a book that was published well 
before Argentina collapsed (see Braga de Macedo et al. 2001). Thirdly, countries can engage 
in monetary regionalism: A group of countries can, similar to the countries of the Eurozone, 
establish their own regional currency union.   
 
                                                 
5 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Zeitreihe WT 5648, www.bundesbank.de/de/statistik/zeitreihen/html/wt5648.htm. 
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3.1. The currency board 
Three elements are characteristic for a currency board: A fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
anchor currency, e.g. the British pound or the Dollar; the unlimited convertibility of the local 
currency into the anchor currency and thirdly the complete coverage of the domestic money 
supply with currency reserves (see Cohen 1998, p. 52).  
 
The concept of a currency board is not new, but rather more than 90 years old. The idea was 
first developed by British colonial authorities. In 1912 the British established the "West 
African Currency Board" for the colonies Gambia, Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone. The model was subsequently also implemented in other British colonies. By 
guaranteeing a fixed exchange rate, trade with the colonies was put on a stable monetary 
foundation. Not only trade was strengthened by the fixed exchange rate but also capital 
transactions. British banks could treat overseas territories as if they were a part of the United 
Kingdom (see Cohen 1998, p. 52f). 
 
This exchange rate regime, developed in colonial times, quickly lost importance after World 
War II. The advantage of monetary stability was less important. Currency boards were 
condemned as symbols of the suppression of developing countries by colonial powers. Apart 
from the British colony Hong Kong currency boards were no longer used. The were 
considered to be relicts of a bygone era. The renaissance of this exchange rate regime started 
with introduction in Argentina in 1991, Estonia 1992 and Lithuania 1994 (see Cohen 1998, p. 
53). The main protagonists of this concept were the IMF and the American Ministry of 
Finance (see Braga de Macedo et al. 2001). 
 
Supporters of this exchange rate regime stress that currency boards provide credibility, 
transparency, low rates of inflation and monetary as well as fiscal stability. By eliminating 
exchange rate risk, interest rates can be very low, which in turn supports economic 
development (see Edwards 2000, p. 27).  
 
It is true that currency boards can, in specific circumstances, provide monetary stability for a 
country. However, the price for that stability is substantial. The following points should be 
considered: 
- A country with a currency board forgoes its own, independent monetary policy.  
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- In a currency board, the central bank does not have any instruments to influence economic 
development. It has no direct influence on the domestic interest rate. 
- The domestic interest rates in a country with a currency board by definition are higher than 
in the country providing the anchor currency. Otherwise investors would have no incentive 
to hold the domestic currency rather than the anchor currency. Furthermore, the interest 
rates are not only higher than in the country providing the anchor currency, they may also 
rise when this is utterly unwanted. In the event of a recession at home, rising interest rates 
in the anchor currency country may deepen or at least prolong the existing recession.  
- The central bank has no influence of the provision of liquidity for the domestic financial 
sector, because domestic money supply cannot be raised if the reserves of foreign currency 
are not rising. This has two consequences: Firstly, in the event of a crisis the central bank 
cannot encourage the domestic financial sector to lend more freely by implementing a 
loose monetary policy. Secondly, the central bank cannot act as a lender-of-last-resort, i.e. 
a crisis in the domestic banking system cannot be fought by the central bank. It cannot 
provide liquidity for it has no control over money supply. 
- The exchange rate cannot be adjusted when external shocks induce just that. In the event 
of a devaluation of the exchange rate of a major trading partner vis-à-vis the anchor 
currency deteriorates the competitive position of the domestic enterprises. To restore the 
competitive position, prices in the domestic economy have to be reduced. A major element 
is the reduction of wages to a significantly lower level. This, however, is a formidable task 
for any economy. Not only is a reduction of the level of wages difficult, it also requires a 
long implementation period.  
- When selecting an anchor currency, careful choices have to be made and trade flows have 
to be considered. Ideally, the anchor currency should be that of the main trading partner.  
 
Since the reserve bank can no longer act as a lender-of-last-resort, instruments have to be 
developed that result in the provision of liquidity in the event of a crisis. Argentina has 
addressed this problem in three ways: Firstly, the local banks were asked to hold very high 
reserves. They had to hold 21 percent of deposits in international reserve currencies either in 
accounts at the Argentinean central bank or with the New York branch of Deutsche Bank (see 
Braga de Macedo et al. 2001, p. 24). Secondly, the central bank had negotiated substantial 
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liquidity credit lines with major international banks.6 Thirdly, the liberalisation of the 
financial sector had led to an increase of the influence of foreign banks. These, in turn, would 
have had access to liquidity provided by their parent companies. Out of the eight largest banks 
in Argentina, seven are owned by foreign banks (see Edwards 2000, p. 30).  
 
It has been demonstrated that a currency board is a complicated type of exchange rate regime 
that requires comprehensive measures to make it sustainable. In comparison with the 
frequently discussed alternative, dollarisation or euroisation, a currency board has some 
advantages: The symbolic value of an own currency remains, and the country does not have to 
give up seignorage, which can be as much as 0.5 percent of GDP (see Cohen 1998, p. 54).   
 
3.2. Experiences in Argentina 
Argentina had introduced a currency board under finance minister Domingo Cavallo in March 
1991. After years of hyperinflation not only the Argentinean government, but also many 
economists considered the introduction of a rigid exchange rate regime a necessary cure. After 
the hyperinflation of the 1980s there were virtually no other options left for Argentina.  
 
Table 2: Inflation and Growth in Argentina 1983 to 2000 
 1983-
92 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Annual change of consumer 
prices in percent 
346.3 10.7 4.2 3.4 0.2 0.5 0.9 -1.2 -0.9 
Change of real GDP in 
percent 
1.7 6.3 5.8 -2.8 5.5 8.1 3.8 -3.4 -0.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Economic Outlook, October 2001. 
 
The “convertibility plan” reduced inflation from 5000 percent in 1989 to 4 percent in 1994. 
Despite today’s problems, the strategy to reduce inflation with the introduction of a currency 
board was a just and adequate measure. The high growth rates achieved in 1993 and 1994 
confirm that monetary stability can make an important contribution to economic growth.  
 
This phase of prosperity, however, did not last long. In 1995, Argentina was faced with a 
massive external shock. Already then it was obvious that the inflexibility of a currency board 
                                                 
6  The sum of these credit lines amounted to 10 percent of all deposits in the Argentinean financial system (see 
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prevented an adequate response of monetary policy to a change in the external economic 
environment. The Mexican crisis, which broke out in December 1994, resulted in the 
abandoning of the fixed exchange rate regime in Mexico. The crisis spread to the rest of the 
continent, quickly being called the Tequila crisis. The inflexibility of the currency board 
immediately was a burden. Although trade with Mexico is not relevant for Argentina, the 
country could not escape the turbulence caused by Mexico. Argentinean economic policy had 
no tools to fight the shock. 
 
Already then it could and should have been asked what the consequences of a change in the 
exchange rate regime in Brazil would have been. The fact that this was not done is partly due 
to the fact that economic recovery commenced quickly. Argentinean economists as well as the 
IMF should have realised that the time for an orderly departure from the currency board had 
come. This was particularly important since trade with Brazil had grown dramatically. 
 
Table 3: Argentinean foreign trade 1992-2000 (in billions of  US-Dollars) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Exports 12.2 13.1 15.7 21.0 23.8 26.4 26.4 23.3 26.3 
Imports 14.9 16.8 21.5 20.1 23.8 30.5 31.4 25.5 25.1 
Exports to Brazil 1.7 2.8 3.7 5.3 6.6 7.8 7.8 5.6 6.8 
Exports to the 
USA 
1.3 1.3 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.6 3.0 
Exports To the EU 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.0 4.6 4.7 4.6 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Directions of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1992-1998 and 2001. 
 
The exchange rate regime contributed to the massive increase in foreign trade. From 1992 to 
1997 exports more than doubled. Exports to Brazil grew strongly. Form 1992 to 1997 they 
almost grew fivefold. Whilst their share in total exports was only  13.9 percent in 1992, that 
ratio had grown to 29.5 percent in 1997. This rapid growth of trade was the direct result of the 
creation of the Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (Mercosur). In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay had created a custom union, which turned out to be one of the more 
successful regional integration projects in Latin America. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Brage de Macedo et al. 2001, p. 24).  
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The growth of exports to the USA, however, was limited. In 2000, only about 10 percent of 
exports went to the United States. The advantage of a stable exchange rate regimes was of 
limited use to Argentinean exporters. At the same time, exports to the European Union 
developed much better. The stagnation of exports to the EU from 1996 correlates with the rise 
of the Dollar vis-à-vis European currencies and the Euro.  
 
The second external shock for the Argentinean economy has been the Asian crisis, which 
caused trouble for a range of developing countries, including neighbouring Brazil. In early 
1999 the Brazilian government had to give up the previously fixed exchange rate of the 
Brazilian real, which subsequently lost half of its value against the Dollar. The fuse of the 
bomb that has now exploded was lit. The dynamic increases in the fastest growing market 
stalled. The devaluation of the real and the weakness of the Euro led the Argentinean export 
economy into crisis. 
 
After this second external shock the only possibility to restore competitiveness was a lowering 
of wages and prices. Generally speaking, these adjustments took place in Argentina, if only at 
a very slow pace. The speed of improvement was far too low to drag the economy out of its 
complicated economic crisis.  
 
This development highlights a major weakness of a currency board: If that regime shall be 
sustainable, labour markets have to be very flexible. In other words: Wages have to be 
reduced drastically in the event of a severe external shock. In Argentina, this was impossible 
because unions are strong and redundancies expensive. High non-wage labour costs also 
contribute to the low downward inflexibility of wages.  
 
The obvious lesson from this experience is that exchange rate regimes cannot be designed 
without careful consideration of both trade flows and socio-economic conditions of a country. 
In the case of Argentina the rigid exchange rate regime caused harm for two reasons: Firstly, 
only a very small part of exports went to the US, the country that provided the anchor 
currency, and a much greater part went to Brazil and the EU. Secondly, labour markets in 
Argentina were not nearly as flexible as they should have been for a sustainable currency 
board.  
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Supporters of a currency board have been suggesting that it will lead to a reduction of interest 
rates. For Argentina, this should have resulted in a lowering of interest rates to the level of the 
USA. However, empirical evidence does not support this claim. Throughout the existence of 
the currency board, the spread between bonds denominated in pesos and similar Dollar bonds 
has been above 500 basis points, i.e. 5 per cent. The spread frequently was above 10 per cent, 
towards the end of 2001 even more than 20 per cent (see Braga de Macedo 2001, S. 24). 
These high interest rates made a return to economic growth difficult if not impossible. In the 
absence of inflation, real interest rates of 25 per cent had to be earned. Needless to say that 
this would have been a tough task for any economy, let alone for one which had lost its 
competitive edge due to an overvaluation of its currency. 
 
But it would be unfair to argue that national economic policy and the ill-designed exchange 
rate regime were exclusively responsible for the crisis. The International Monetary Fund has 
to bear a substantial part of the responsibility for the economic drama that Argentina is 
confronted with. Firstly, the IMF supported the currency board far too long. At the latest after 
the devaluation of the real in 1999 the IMF should have made proposals for an orderly 
departure from the currency board. Secondly, the IMF as always demanded a restrictive fiscal 
policy which deepened the crisis. A pro-cyclical economic policy that lowers government 
expenditure in the midst of a crisis is not wise. The failure of the austerity policy prescribed 
by the fund was followed by a call for even stricter austerity (see Krugman 2002). This shows 
also that the IMF is unwilling to learn from past mistakes: During the Asian crisis, the IMF 
has made the same mistake. Countries had to simultaneously lower government expenditure 
and raise taxes. The pro-cyclical fiscal policy that the IMF called for caused severe economic 
harm both in East Asia and in Argentina. 
 
The IMF has asked for a reduction of government expenditure at a time when Argentina was 
already virtually cut off from international financial markets. This policy recommendation was 
accompanied by fresh money from the Fund. In 2000, the IMF lent $ 40 billion to Argentina, 
followed by another $ 8 billion in August 2001. The combination of these two policies was 
inconsistent. The Fund should have either provided credit for a stimulation of the domestic 
economy, but without the call for a tight fiscal policy, or the IMF should have stopped lending 
earlier and should have made it clear that overcoming the crisis would require tougher 
measures.  
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Up to now the focus was on the problems related to the implementation of a currency board. A 
mayor disadvantage of a currency board, however, is the astronomical cost of giving up the 
currency board during a severe economic crisis. This is evident when looking at the choices 
that the Argentinean government had to make. They could choose between dollarisation, i.e. 
giving up their currency all together, or letting the exchange rate float. Dollarisation would not 
have solved the problem of weak demand and high foreign debt, but would instead have 
created new, additional problems.7 Shifting to a floating exchange rate regime can also create 
a number of new economic nightmares. 
 
The first issue concerns the change from the old fixed exchange rate to the new rate. This is 
not a problem if both debt and claims are exchanged at the same rate. If, like in Argentina, 
savings shall be exchanged at a better rate than debt, the banks have a shortfall.8 The value of 
their own claims is reduced, whilst their liabilities stay the same (in Dollar terms). As a 
consequence, many banks in Argentina face bankruptcy. The foreign banks also suffer a 
shortfall, and although they could be re-capitalised by their parent company, it is hard to see 
that this would be a reasonable procedure. If foreign banks would have to cover the cost of the 
asymmetric exchange of debts and claims, this would constitute a massive tax burden for 
them.9  
 
A reduction of the debt burden for both the Argentinean government and the local companies 
is desirable. However, the cost of such a measure, whichever form it has, will eventually have 
to be covered not only by foreign holders of Argentinean debt, but also by Argentinean savers. 
They will have to face a reduction in the real value of their assets. This constitutes a major 
burden for the economy. After many years of hyperinflation, the citizens had developed a 
certain trust in the stability of their currency, and of the domestic financial system. Now, these 
hopes have not been fulfilled. Argentineans are bitterly disappointed that once again they have 
lost their savings. It is very unlikely that this shock will be overcome quickly. Instead, it will 
be entirely rational not to keep any savings in Argentina, but deposit them elsewhere. Capital 
flight will again be a feature of daily life in Argentina. This, in turn, will make the financing 
                                                 
7 See also the section on dollarisation.  
8 President Duhalde had suggested such an asymmetric exchange of debt and claims because he claimed 
Argentineans should not become the victims of the financial system (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7.1.2002, 
p. 14). 
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of investment out of domestic sources very difficult. Both for savings and for credit, 
Argentina will in the future depend even more on other financial markets rather than its own. 
It appears that the currency board has destroyed more faith in the financial sector than the 
hyperinflation of the 1989s. Furthermore, it is hard to envisage a rapid return to both a 
credible monetary policy and to a path of economic growth under these circumstances. 
 
But there additional problems of monetary policy following the devaluation of the peso. 
Servicing the country’s foreign debt is now even harder. Although the exports of Argentina 
may rise, the cost of debt service expressed in peso has risen substantially. In 2001, the 
country had an external debt, both public and private, of about $ 145 billion. With the old 
exchange rate, this was 54.1 percent of the country’s GDP of $ 268 billion. Even with the 
exchange rate of February 2002, about 2 pesos per Dollar, the picture has changed 
dramatically. GDP is reduced by half, but external debt has remained the same. $ 145 billion 
is now 108 percent of GDP. And a few weeks later, in early April, the current exchange rate of 
3 pesos per Dollar has raised the relative burden of the foreign debt even higher to roughly 
160 percent of GDP. Argentina will under no circumstances be able to pay back its external 
debt completely. 
 
Despite this very negative assessment, the currency board cannot be evaluated without due 
consideration of the early successes. This exchange rate regime initially worked well and 
enabled the country to overcome the hyperinflation of the 1980s. However, the Mexican crisis 
of 1995 demonstrated how vulnerable Argentina has become because of its rigid exchange 
rate regime. The numerous mistakes and mishandlings in Argentinean economic policy cannot 
be attributed to the currency board. But this exchange rate regime can only be sustained if a 
number of conditions are guaranteed, e.g. the downward flexibility of wages and a very 
disciplined fiscal policy. Such a demanding exchange rate regime is not a good 
recommendation in particular for developing countries with democratically elected 
governments. Currency boards were designed for colonies, not for independent economies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 Consequently, the EU finance ministers warned the Argentinean government not to put too great a burden on 
the banks. The financial sector could not cover an unreasonable share of the cost of the devaluation (Financial 
Times, 22.1.2002,. p. 6).  
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3.3. Flexible exchange rates: The better option? 
The experience of Argentina shows that fixed exchange rates are hard to maintain even in a 
currency board. Other types of more or less fixed exchange rate regimes, e.g. a crawling peg 
or a crawling band, are similarly difficult in a longer period. In virtually all recent financial 
crises, fixed exchange rates that had to be abandoned played an important role. In Mexico, the 
crises in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea as well as in Brazil, fixed exchange rates were 
given up soon after the pressure started to built up. The bipolar view, developed after theses 
crises and asking for either a currency board or flexible exchange rates, suggests that other 
exchange rate regimes are crisis prone and not sustainable. But how crisis prone and 
sustainable is a regime of fully flexible exchange rates? 
 
The assessment of exchange rate regimes cannot be made without identifying the primary 
goals. The first and foremost goal is the facilitation of international trade. Export and import 
of both goods and services should be supported by the exchange rate regime. The second goal 
is the promotion of investment. Both foreign direct investment as well as domestic investment 
financed from foreign sources, either by credit or by bonds, should be assisted. Third, 
macroeconomic stability, in particular of the domestic currency, should not be undermined by 
the exchange rate regime. Reaching moderate inflation shall not be made impossible.  
 
It is quite obvious that flexible exchange rates pose a substantial risk for developing countries. 
First of all trade is affected. If the exchange rate fluctuates wildly, exporters and importers 
either have to accept these changes or they have to hedge their business. The latter means that 
they have to buy exchange rate stability from suppliers of that insurance. These are mainly big 
international banks. Hedging, however, is quite expensive for exporters and importers. The 
greater the volatility of the exchange rate, the higher the cost of hedging.   
 
Looking at this problem from a different angle, one can argue that a stable exchange rate is a 
public good that should be provided by governments. In a regime with flexible exchange rates, 
the cost of stabilising exchange rates has to be covered by private actors, the ex- and 
importers, who have to hedge their deals against exchange rate fluctuations. These costs 
reduce the competitive position of exporters on world markets compared to a system in which 
governments do provide that stability. Although flexible exchange rates are less problematic 
in developed countries with strong, competitive companies, for the developing world this is a 
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problem. Flexible exchange rate regimes make the integration of developing countries into 
world markets significantly more difficult. 
 
With regard to foreign debt and foreign direct investment, flexible rates are also problematic. 
A lack of capital is a common feature of developing economies. In most cases, investment has 
to be financed by using capital from abroad, either in form of credit or direct foreign 
investment. When borrowing abroad, domestic investors have to cover the exchange rate risk, 
because virtually the entire foreign debt of developing countries is denominated either in 
Dollar or in another OECD-currency. If the exchange rate deteriorates, the debt service rises. 
But even in the case of foreign direct investment the instability of the exchange rate can 
influence investment behaviour negatively. Although the foreign investor covers the exchange 
rate risk, the result of a weaker exchange rate is that in order to achieve an expected return in 
dollars, the profit in domestic currency has to rise. If that rise in profit cannot be achieved, the 
likeliness of further investment will probably be reduced.  
 
Finally, volatile exchange rates endanger macroeconomic stability. In the event of a 
substantial devaluation, the likely consequence is imported inflation: The domestic price level 
rises if imports get dearer. Imported inflation can wipe out previous successful programmes of 
macroeconomic stabilisation.  
 
3.4. The South African case: Why did the exchange rate of the Rand collapse? 
A recent example for the problems that can result from flexible exchange rates is South 
Africa. Since 1994, the country has implemented comprehensive measures of deregulation 
and liberalisation, including the dismantling of capital controls. The Rand floats freely.10 
 
For more six months in 2001, the South African economy was hit by a sharp drop of the 
exchange rate vis-à-vis Dollar and Euro. Since the beginning of 2002 the Rand has recovered 
a bit. A declining exchange rate as such is not new: In January 1990, the exchange rate was 
Rand 2.56 to the Dollar. From then, the nominal exchange rate declined slowly, but steadily. 
However, in itself this is not a problem, since South Africa had a higher inflation rate than the 
US. The real exchange rate remained relatively stable.  
                                                 
10 See IMF Annual Report 2001, p. 125.  
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In 2001, the speed of devaluation increased dramatically. On 2nd January, 2001, the exchange 
rate was Rand 7.56 to the Dollar and on 2nd July 8.01. At the end of December 2001, the 
South African currency was only traded at over 12 Rand to the Dollar.11 With such a strong 
devaluation, the macroeconomic data of South Africa should provide at least a partial 
explanation. However, this is not the case. 
 
Table 4: South Africa’s macroeconomic development 1999-2002 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real GDP, annual change in % 1.9 3.1 3.5 3.0 
Consumer prices, change against 
previous year in % 
5.3 5.3 5.5 4.3 
Balance of budget, in % of GDP -2.3 -2.0 -2.3 -2.0 
Balance of current account in % 
of GDP 
-0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -1.1 
External debt in % of GDP 29.6 29.4 32.0 34.1 
Debt service in % of exports 15.8 13.8 12.3 9.1 
Source:  Deutsche Bank Research, Perspektiven Südafrika, Februar 2001. Data for 2000 are estimates, for 2001 and 
2002 forecasts of Research. 
 
The macroeconomic data do not provide a hint: Neither with regard to economic growth nor 
with regard to inflation is South Africa’s economy in an alarming constitution. South Africa’s 
foreign debt is not alarmingly high. The country’s fiscal policy is prudent: At 2% of GDP, the 
budget deficit is even low enough for the strict criteria of the Treaty of Maastricht. Therefore, 
it is entirely justified that the South African President Thabo Mbeki denied that the Rand’s 
weakness has anything to do with problems in the real economy.12 
 
Economist are confronted with a riddle. Without a doubt, South Africa is confronted with 
massive economic and social problems. The entire region is suffering from instability and 
political problems in neighbouring countries, e.g. Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe,  are 
unsolved (see Dieter/Melber/Lamb 2001). The Aids pandemic is a huge burden for the 
economy. However, all these problems are not new, but well known for a long time.  
 
                                                 
11 Data from the US Federal Reserve Bank, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/hist/dat96_sf.txt. 
12 Financial Times, 11th January 2002, p. 13. 
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Explanations for the Rand’s weakness have to be found elsewhere. Firstly, the weakness of 
the currency could have been the result of a sudden and collective drop of investor confidence 
due to the recent political developments in Zimbabwe. In particular the absence of free and 
fair elections could have caused a change of investor’s perspective. Thus, the weakness of the 
Rand would have had less to do with economic and political developments in South Africa 
and more with the trouble in Zimbabwe. The currency would function as a barometer for 
investor sentiment. 
 
Although this explanation can claim a certain plausibility, second thoughts remain. South 
Africa’s government has no decisive influence on developments in Zimbabwe. The 
comparatively solid macroeconomic policy of South Africa would be less important than 
political developments in the neighbourhood. The bottom line would therefore be that 
developing countries with flexible exchange rate regimes do not only have to provide good 
governance and democratic regimes in their own territory, but also in the entire region if they 
want to have stable exchange rates.  
 
A second explanation can also claim some plausibility. To curb already existing pressure on 
the Rand, in October 2001 the South African central bank introduced measures that should 
have made speculation more difficult. As a result, the amount of foreign exchange traded was 
reduced. Unexpectedly, these measures made the Rand more vulnerable against speculation, 
because selling pressure had a higher impact. The limitations on currency trading also resulted 
in a reluctance of exporters to exchange foreign currency into Rand, and this subsequently led 
to a reduced demand for Rand.13 
 
Presumably both factors have contributed to the devaluation of the currency. This, however, 
does not make the consequences of the lower exchange rate less severe. The Rand today is 
probably the world’s most undervalued currency.14 The repercussions for South Africa’s 
economy are dramatic. Three consequences have to be considered: Servicing foreign debt will 
become more difficult, foreign investors will expect a higher return in domestic currency for 
their investments and inflation will rise. However, the undervaluation of the currency also has 
                                                 
13 Financila Times, 11th January 2002, p. 13.  
14 Following the Economist’s surprisingly accurate Big Mac index, the Rand at the end of 2001 was traded 68% 
below its real value (The Economist, 22.12.2001, p. 134).  
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two advantages: The competitive position of exporters rises and on the domestic market 
competition with importers is made much easier.  
 
The example of South Africa shows that flexible exchange rates are not a simple solution for 
developing countries and emerging markets. Although flexible exchange rates have fewer 
disadvantages than currency boards, they still display enough faults. Both currency regime 
render the national economic policy toothless. In both cases the dependence on external 
influences compared with other exchange rate regimes rises dramatically. Whether a 
depreciation in neighbouring Brazil or political trouble in the region, the effects for the 
domestic economy are severe. These two exchange rate regimes cannot be the standard 
solutions for developing countries. 
 
3.5. Dollarisation and Euroisation: An expression of desperation? 
Following the collapse of the Argentinean currency board, some economists have suggested 
the complete disposal of an own currency and have proposed the introduction of the Dollar as 
the only legal tender (see Hanke/Schuler 2001). Exchange rate risk would be completely 
eliminated. A number of countries have chosen this path for quite some time: Panama is using 
the US-Dollar, Liechtenstein has opted for the Swiss Franc, Monaco for the French Franc and 
now the Euro. Up to 2002, Andorra used both the French Franc and the Spanish Peseta as 
legal tender. Both El Salvador and Ecuador have decided to give up their national currencies 
and have declared the US- Dollar as the only legal tender. In Kosovo and Macedonia, the Euro 
has been introduced. But these countries are all small and, from an economic point of view, 
insignificant. For large countries, there are a number of good reasons why an own currency 
should not be given up: 
- An own currency can contribute to the development of a spirit of community, which my 
be beneficial for the political stabilisation of a territory. 
- Without an own currency one loses the so called seignorage. This profit from coinage can 
reach substantial levels. In the case of Argentina, seignorage has been about $ 780 million 
per annum (see Deutscher Bundestag 2001, p. 30). 
- Without own currency an economy cannot be managed by the government. In particular 
the inability to develop an own interest rate policy is causing harm.  
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- Without an own currency it is impossible to insulate an economy from the rest of the 
world. Without a monetary border the creation of an independent economic policy cannot 
fully succeed. 
- Using foreign currency makes a country subject to potential blackmail. Since the provision 
of liquidity is not guaranteed, an economy can be severely damaged if the government of 
the country that provides the legal tender interrupts supply. In the case of dollarisation a 
dependence on the goodwill of the American government is created. In 1988, Panama had 
to learn that this dependence can be dangerous.15 
-  
The bottom line is simple: If political and economic independence is desired, then the 
adoption of another country’s currency is not advisable.  
 
3.6. Intermediate exchange rate regimes 
The debate on the appropriate exchange rate regime for developing countries and emerging 
markets has gained momentum after the collapse of the Argentinean currency board. Before 
looking at the remaining options, I would like to point out that stable exchange rates in the 
periphery of the world economy are hard to achieve as long as volatility continues to exist 
between the Dollar, the Euro and the Yen. In a number of recent financial crises, in particular 
the crises in Asia and in Argentina, fluctuations of exchange rates in the core of the world 
economy played an important role. In Asia, the countries that had tied their currencies to the 
Dollar suffered a severe blow to the competitiveness of their companies when the Dollar 
appreciated against the Yen and the European currencies. In Argentina, the continuing 
strength of the Dollar reduced the competitive position of exporters and import competing 
domestic producers.  
 
Without a mechanism for the stabilisation of exchange rates between Dollar, Euro and Yen, 
developing countries will not be able to provide stable exchange rates of their own currencies. 
However, currently the call for at least an exchange rate band does not receive a lot of support 
                                                 
15 The Reagan Administration decided that deposits of Panama in American banks would be frozen. A transfer of 
dollars to Panama was prohibited. The shock was severe: Most banks had to close and the entire economy 
suffered from an acute shortage of liquidity. The attempt of the government to quickly create a new currency to 
substitute the Dollar was not successful. The economy was demonetised. Within one year output declined by 20 
per cent (see Cohen 1998, p. 45).  
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on both sides of the Atlantic, let alone in Japan, which has more dramatic economic problems 
to solve.16 
 
If both currency boards and fully flexible exchange rates are excluded, a number of 
intermediate regimes are available. Both corner solutions, however, have one thing in 
common: central banks have to be rather passive in both systems. In all intermediate regimes, 
the central bank has a much more prominent role to play and is more or less actively trying to 
influence the exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
16 Nevertheless, 11 out of 29 experts of a working group of the American Council on Foreign Relations supported 
the call for a target zone between the major currencies. Among those advocates of more stable exchange rates 
were the economist Fred C. Bergsten, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Paul Volcker, and the 
hedge fund manager and successful speculator, George Soros (see Council on Foreign Relations 1999, p. 129).  
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Table 5: Exchange rate regimes 
Type characteristics  main advantages main disadvantages examples 
1) without own 
currency/         
dollarisation 
complete adoption of 
a foreign currency as 
legal tender  
monetary stability no monetary 
autonomy, loss of 
profit from coinage 
Ecuador, Panama, 
Palau 
2) currency board fixed exchange rate, 
convertibility in 
anchor currency, 
domestic money 
supply is completely 
backed by foreign 
reserves 
monetary stability, 
sustaining profit from 
coinage 
loss of monetary 
autonomy  
Argentina (1991-
2002), Bosnia, 
Brunei, Bulgaria, 
Hong Kong, 
Estonia, Lithuania 
3) fixed exchange 
rate with a single 
anchor currency 
exchange rate fixed to 
one currency within a 
narrow band and 
infrequent 
adjustments 
monetary autonomy can 
be sustained 
without capital 
controls risk of 
instability, 
appreciation of anchor 
currency worsens 
competitive position 
of companies 
China, Iran, 
Malaysia, 
Namibia, Trinidad 
4) fixed exchange 
rate with a 
currency basket 
Fixing of exchange 
rate to a basket of 
currencies 
stable real exchange 
rate can be provided 
without capital 
controls risk of 
instability 
Botswana, 
Morocco, Latvia, 
Tonga 
5) fixed exchange 
rate with exchange 
rate bands  
co-operative regime  stable exchange rates 
within the system, 
adjustments possible, 
flexibility vis-à-vis 
other currencies 
without capital 
controls risk of 
instability 
European 
Monetary System 
(until 1998), 
Denmark  
6) crawling pegs frequent adjustments 
of the exchange rate 
using one indicator, 
e.g. the different 
inflation rates of 
domestic and anchor 
currency  
stable real exchange 
rate can be provided 
without capital 
controls risk of 
instability, need for 
macroeconomic 
discipline 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Zimbabwe 
7) crawling bands exchange rate bands 
with frequent 
adjustments 
stable real exchange 
rate can be provided 
without capital 
controls risk of 
instability, need for 
macroeconomic 
discipline 
Israel, Uruguay 
8) managed 
floating 
central bank tries to 
managed the 
exchange rate without 
using specific 
indicators 
stable real exchange 
rate can be provided 
without capital 
controls risk of 
instability, need for 
macroeconomic 
discipline 
Jamaica, Slovenia, 
Norway  
9) flexible 
exchange rate 
central bank only 
monitors the 
development of the 
exchange rate 
markets determine the 
development of the 
exchange rate, no risk 
of costly an 
unsuccessful 
intervention 
high cost of hedging 
for exporters and 
importers 
Australia, Brazil, 
Eurozone, Chile, 
Indonesia, USA 
Source (for examples): International Monetary Fund Annual Report 2001, S. 124f. 
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The seven intermediate exchange rate regimes have a common disadvantage: They do not 
work very well if capital flows are fully liberalised. With high, volatile capital flows, central 
banks have problems to stabilise exchange rates. The underlying dilemma is described in the 
impossible trinity of international finance. Monetary policy tries to reach three goals at the 
same time: independence of monetary policy, unrestricted flows of capital and stable 
exchange rates. However, it is impossible to reach more than two goals at the same time. 
Monetary policy can only choose between the following three options: 
- Either a stable exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. This option requires the 
use of capital controls.  
- Or unrestricted capital flows and an independent monetary policy. In this case the 
exchange rate will have to be flexible. 
- Or unrestricted capital flows and a stable exchange rate. The central bank gives up an 
independent monetary policy and concentrates its activities on the stabilisation of 
exchange rates (see Frenkel/Menkhoff 2000, p. 11ff; Fischer 2001, p. 8).  
 
The first option describes the system of Bretton Woods. Capital controls were a central 
element of that monetary regime. These controls are necessary to enable the implementation 
of an independent monetary policy. For instance, in the absence of capital controls the 
lowering of domestic interest rates would lead to an outflow of capital with subsequent 
pressure on the exchange rate. Bretton Woods was a stable financial system for more than 20 
years. Moreover, Bretton Woods was a period of rapid economic growth of the global 
economy. Another example is China, which also generated exceptional growth over a long 
period of time. During the Asian crisis China could maintain its fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis 
the Dollar primarily because of the tight capital controls it implements. 
 
The second case describes our current system in the OECD outside the Eurozone. Exchange 
rates fluctuate and capital flows are more or less unrestricted and national monetary policy 
enjoys a certain autonomy, at least in the larger OECD-countries.  
 
The third case is plausible from an economic point of view, but not politically. The reason is 
that in such a scenario, monetary policy has to give absolute priority to the stabilisation of the 
exchange rate. The consequence is that the central bank may have to raise interest rates even if 
that is counterproductive for the domestic economy. In democratic societies very few interest 
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groups would support such a monetary policy. Both trade unions and employers’ associations 
are not willing to accept a stable exchange rate as the primary target of monetary policy. Also, 
many sectors of an economy are not affected by changes in the exchange rate and would 
therefore not support a policy that ignores the consequences for the domestic economy.  
 
Before the First World War, such policies were implemented under the gold standard. The 
participating countries made the stability of the exchange rate an absolute priority of their 
economic policy. In the three core countries of the gold standard, i.e. France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, the gold reserves and the convertibility at a given exchange rate were 
defended regardless of the short-term cost for the domestic economy (see Eichengreen 2000, 
p. 51). The political opposition against these policies was limited, mainly because trade 
unions were too weak to argue their case: Full employment was not yet on the political 
agenda.  
 
The bottom line is: Stable exchange rates and an independent monetary policy are only 
achievable with capital controls.17 For developing countries and, to a degree, emerging 
markets there are many reasons why they should not liberalise capital flows completely. 
Whereas the contribution of stable exchange rates to the economic growth of an economy is 
well documented, liberalised capital flows do not always have the same positive effects. 
Selective restrictions of capital flows should be the norm, not the exception, for developing 
countries. 
 
The support for such restrictions should not be put on a level with protectionism in trade, 
quite the opposite. The American economist and staunch supporter of free trade, Jagdish 
Bhagwati, immediately after the Asian crisis declared that free trade suffers from frequent 
financial crises. Liberalised trade is supporting economic growth, whilst the same cannot be 
said about unrestricted capital flows (see Bhagwati 1998, pp. 7-12).  
 
Although these policies can be implemented unilaterally, it would be positive if the IMF 
would support their implementation. Without such support, many countries will be reluctant 
to return to capital controls, partly because their implementation will, at least in the medium 
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to long term, require the support of the IMF and the major financial centres. National capital 
controls can be implemented much better if international co-operation on the control of capital 
movements will be strengthened. As long as this does not exist, the illegal export of capital is 
no big risk. If the money is not detected at the border, there is no future risk for the exporter of 
capital. In case receiving countries would also have to report the import of capital, the 
sustainability of capital controls would greatly rise.  
 
The recent move of OECD countries to discipline offshore financial centres is a step into the 
right direction. If offshore financial centres can no longer be used to hide the financial 
resources of terrorist, this also means that capital flight from developing countries could, at 
least theoretically, be controlled more easily. Needless to say that this would constitute a 
major policy shift in Washington, which still appears to be politically unrealistic. Beyond the 
fight against terrorism there is little will to limit the freedom of the owners of capital. 
 
3.7. Monetary regionalism: A new strategy for stable exchange rates? 
The introduction of the Euro has motivated other regions to consider the benefits of regional 
monetary integration. The creation of a joint currency only eliminates exchange rate risk 
between the participating countries and not vis-à-vis third countries. But this additional 
stability is important enough to make monetary regionalism a promising project. Outside of 
the European Union, discussion on the creation of a joint currency has started in East Asia, in 
the Mercosur, the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and the Eurasian Economic 
Community.18  
 
Both the Asian crisis and the current disaster in Argentina have demonstrated the need for 
monetary co-operation. In East Asia, up to the crisis many policy makers had the illusion that 
they could integrate their economies into the world market without having to co-operate on a 
regional level. Furthermore, until the crisis erupted policy makers had no incentive to expect a 
dramatic collapse of their economies with the subsequent need to ask the IMF for assistance. 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Stanley Fischer, for many years the most important figure in the IMF, accepts this conclusion and asserts that 
the implementation of capital controls permit a stable exchange rate. In Fischer’s opinion , the problem is the 
declining efficiency of capital controls. Over time, the evasion of capital controls rises (see Fischer 2001, p. 10). 
18 The Eurasian Economic Community comprises Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzia. In 
spring 2002, the governor of Kazakhstan’s central bank suggested a single currency (International Herald 
Tribune, 24 April 2002, p. 19).  
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Today, the views have changed: The elite in East Asia see the need for monetary regionalism 
in East Asia, although the exact shape of the integration process is far from clear.19 
 
In the countries forming the Mercosur, there has been a discussion on the need for monetary 
co-operation for some time. At the end of 2000, the participating countries agreed on joint 
convergence criteria. Following the model of the treaty of Maastricht, the countries developed 
a plan for the years 2002 to 2005 and agreed on maximum levels for inflation (less than 5 
percent), government debt (less than 40 percent of GDP) and allowed deficit in the public 
sector (3 percent of GDP at the most). The associated countries Chile and Bolivia have 
accepted these convergence criteria (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 December 2000, 
p. 18). Needless to say that these plans are an illusion. There will not be any monetary co-
operation in the Mercosur before Argentina has not reached somewhat safer territory. It would 
be foolish to further weaken the Mercosur for the sake of rescuing Argentina. Even though a 
solution for Argentina is hard to envisage at this stage, policy makers in the region have 
continued to put the creation of a joint currency on their agenda. For instance, for the 
Mercosur Summit in February 2002 the issue was put on the program (see Handelsblatt, 21 
January 2002, p. 6).  
 
The creation of a joint currency is not a simple, technical task. The preconditions for the 
successful implementation of monetary regionalism are high. Before a common currency can 
be introduced, a number of intermediate stages have to be taken. These are both economic 
measures to generate convergence as well as political measures to create intra-regional policy 
networks (see Dieter/Higgott 2002; Kim/Ryou/Wang 2000). Against the background of the 
financial crisis of the recent past, it seems plausible to expect that a number of regions will 
follow the example of the European Union and will decide to give up their own currency in 
favour of a regional currency, despite substantial difficulties (see Fischer 2001, p. 17). 
Considering the existing alternatives, monetary regionalism appears to provide substantial 
benefits at a reasonable price. 
 
After Argentina, the decision for an appropriate exchange rate regime for developing countries 
and emerging markets has to be answered in a more differentiated manner. If countries do not 
want to use capital controls, it appears that only flexible exchange rates are sustainable in the 
                                                 
19 For a discussion of the changing nature of regionalism in East Asia see Dieter and Higgott 2002.  
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long run. However, the experience of South Africa has clearly demonstrated that flexible 
exchange rates are causing severe trouble for an economy: The uncertainty about future 
exchange rates makes international trade more expensive, shortens the time horizon of the 
private sector and consequently reduces investment and growth perspectives.    
 
Exchange rate regimes that are supported by selective capital controls currently are more 
recommendable for many developing countries than the so called corner solutions (see Braga 
de Macedo et al 2001, p. 24). If countries wish to benefit from the integration into 
international financial markets and at the same time want stable exchange rates, the only 
option is monetary regionalism. However, the implementation of such a far reaching scheme 
will take quite some time. 
 
4.  BAILING-IN OF CREDITORS AND OTHER MEASURES TO STABILISE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
4.1 Rollover-options 
In some of the recent financial crises currency and credit crises have fuelled each other. The 
cancellation of credit contracts has led to an outflow of capital and put the exchange rate 
under pressure. Therefore, the stabilisation of the debtor-creditor-relationship is directly 
linked with more stable exchange rates. 
 
The bailing-in of creditors has long been discussed, but there is no convincing solution yet. So 
far, the experience with the management of debt crises is not satisfying. In many cases the 
restructuring of debt saved creditors from facing the consequences of their risky lending. In 
these cases, a part of the bill was paid by those banks that showed a prudent lending 
behaviour, but an even greater sacrifice had to be made by the citizens of the affected 
countries. In many cases, the poorest people were punished for the irresponsible activities of 
foreign creditors. 
 
Although the bailing-in of creditors has been discussing with increased intensity in recent 
years, there is no substantial regulation of this issue up to now. One problem in this context is 
the divergence of the American and the European position in the IMF. The USA insists on a 
case-by-case approach, whereas the Europeans favour a rules-based arrangement. The 
European proposal is obviously more transparent than the American one. The latter’s 
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approach reflects the desire to decide according to American preferences and interest.20 The 
European proposal is driven by a motive that favours regulation over ad hoc measures. Also, 
the European approach takes into consideration the need for a clear set of rules for 
international financial markets. It is necessary to fix the procedure for the event of a credit 
crisis when the deal is done, rather then when the crisis hits.  
 
To discuss the bailing-in of creditors in the financial turbulence is a second-best solution. Far 
better is the construction of measures that enable the debtors themselves to activate 
stabilisation measures. In 1999, two British economists have made an interesting proposal. 
William Buiter and Anne Sibert suggested the introduction of Universal Debt-Rollover 
Options with a Penalty (UDROP). The idea is pretty simple: Debtors have the option to roll-
over a credit upon maturity and extend the repayment period for three or six months. The 
price for this unilateral roll-over, the penalty, is set when the credit contract is signed. The aim 
of UDROP is to avoid liquidity crises caused by creditor panic (see Buiter/Sibert 1999). 
Creditor shall be given the option to find shelter until orderly market conditions have been 
resorted. Until the markets have calmed down, the country under pressure can, at a calculable 
price, demand the deferral of payment.  
 
UDROP shall cover all credit denominated in foreign currency. They shall cover both private 
and public credit intake with short and long maturity. Overdraft credit shall be covered as well 
(see Buiter/Sibert 1999, p. 3). 
 
This concept has number of convincing advantages. Firstly, UDROPs are a type of low-impact 
regulation that requires very limited government involvement. The state sets rules and 
supervises their implementation, but it is not involved in the precise arrangements the two 
parties of the credit contract set for themselves. As in other fields, financial markets are forced 
to accept government regulations. Secondly, UDROP can be implemented without a global 
consensus on the matter, which is hard to achieve at the moment. Instead of waiting for the 
creation of a global lender-of-last-resort, UDROP would immediately make a significant 
contribution to the reduction of the likeliness of liquidity crises. Thirdly, UDROP have a 
                                                 
20 This, however, is nothing new. In the debt crisis of the 80s the USA followed a very arbitrary policy. For 
instance, in 1988 Argentina violated IMF conditions several times. To secure interest payments to American 
commercial banks, the US-Administration intervened in the IMF and the World Bank and managed to organise 
fresh credit for Argentina despite the various breaches of agreed conditionality (see Raffer 1990, p. 308).  
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positive, stabilising effect on exchange rates. In particular in a regime of flexible exchange 
rates, the sudden and unexpected outflow of foreign currency to pay back foreign loans can 
put the exchange rate under severe pressure. If, due to the extended maturity of the loans, 
fewer debtors have to pay back their loan at the same time, the chance of a more stable 
exchange rate rises.21 
 
The UDROP concept tries to address a weak point of unregulated financial markets. In the 
event of a crisis a debtor does gain time, a precious good in such times. Beyond this advantage 
the need to set the price for the use of the option when the deal is done is a positive side-
effect. It forces both debtors and creditors to evaluate the risk of a credit more carefully. In the 
past, lenders too often ignored those risks, assuming correctly that the IMF would bail them 
out in the event of a crisis. With the introduction of UDROP, it could be made clear that there 
will not be a public bail-out any more. Consequently, both parties to a credit contract would 
have to evaluate risk thoroughly.  
 
Finally, UDROP can also be implemented in an entire region and can be a building bloc of a 
monetary and financial regional integration process.22  
 
However, UDROP also have substantial disadvantages. It can be expected that borrowing 
abroad will initially become more expensive.23 This is not necessarily a bad thing. Borrowing 
domestically becomes cheaper relative to borrowing abroad. Domestic borrowing is much less 
dangerous for an economy than borrowing abroad, since by definition there is no exchange 
rate risk for domestic credit.  
 
Another potential disadvantage of UDROP is that they can lead to the delayed acceptance of 
economic problems in an economy. If the crisis is more severe, i.e. the borrowers are 
confronted with a solvency and not a temporary liquidity crisis, then the solution of the 
problem might be delayed. However,  this argument is quite weak. Assuming that lenders 
evaluate credit risk thoroughly, there still might be a delay of bankruptcy in some cases, but 
not in entire economies.  
                                                 
21 The same logic applies to fixed exchange rates. A central bank will quickly reach the limits of its foreign 
reserves if, due to a panic, too much foreign currency is required at short notice.  
22 For the details of the concept of monetary regionalism see Dieter 2000. 
 42
Overall, the advantages of UDROP are convincing. The limited disadvantages do not discredit 
the concept. Although these rollover-options are no panacea for the avoidance of financial 
crisis, they could make a significant contribution to the stabilisation of financial markets 
without confronting the markets with an excess of regulation. If, however, an international 
lender-of-last-resort could be created, UDROP would not be necessary any more.  
 
4.2. Collective action clauses 
Bonds have become much more important on international financial markets. Before the debt 
crises of the 1980s, capital flowing to public borrowers in developing countries primarily was 
in the form of bank credit with medium maturity, i.e. of a couple of years. The capital was 
typically provided by bank consortia. In 1980, that type was borrowing represented almost 100 
percent of new debt of public borrowers from developing countries. Within the next 20 years 
bank credit lost much of its importance, and the bond market grew rapidly. At the end of the 
90s, the percentage of bank credit in all lending to developing countries had fallen to less than 
20 percent, the remainder filled by bonds (see Lipworth/Nystedt 2001). 
 
The growing preference for bonds was partly based on the assumption that this type of debt 
would be more difficult to restructure than conventional bank credit. Bond holders assumed 
that sovereign states would try practically everything to avoid default since that would be a 
messy and costly affair: With thousands of bondholders involved, such a restructuring could 
not be arranged as simple as a restructuring of a conventional bank loan with only a dozen of 
banks involved. In the 90s, the preference for bonds spread further. Private borrowers from 
developing countries started to emit bonds on international financial markets instead of 
borrowing from banks.  
 
This shift from loans to bonds has created new problems in the solution of debt crises. The 
large number of bondholders involved in any restructuring makes a co-ordination of their 
decisions very complicated. 
 
Against this background it is obvious that bond contracts have to be made more crisis-proof. 
The most important proposal is the introduction of so-called collective action clauses. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
23 In the medium and long run, foreign borrowing could become cheaper, because the introduction of UDROP 
could stabilise the financial system of a country, which would in turn reduce risk premiums. 
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primary objective is to stop lenders from accelerating the maturity of a bond. Without such 
clauses, the is a continuing risk that bond holders ask for a premature repayment of their bond: 
In the event of a temporary liquidity problem, with the consequent delay of interest payments, 
bondholders can demand the immediate return of their money. It is these calls for repayment 
that may cause a temporary problem to be transformed into a full-blown financial crises. 
 
But the problems with bonds go further. In the event of a solvency crisis, the debt of a 
borrower will have to be restructured. This requires a partial debt forgiveness. If there are no 
collective action clauses, each and every bondholder will have to approve a proposal for debt 
restructuring, and without unanimity the solution of the debt problem can be delayed for a 
long time. Collective action clauses can solve the problem: If a certain majority of 
bondholders approve, this decision will have to be accepted also by the dissenting minority.  
 
Collective action clauses have already been in introduced in the UK. Bonds emitted in Great 
Britain can be restructured if at least 70 per cent of the bondholders agree to the restructuring. 
Luxembourg has also made collective action clauses a compulsory element of bond 
emissions.24 
 
For the emission of bonds from developing countries, New York is more important than the 
European financial centres. Therefore, it is most important that collective action clauses will 
be the norm in bonds emitted in New York. In other words: Collective action clauses should 
be introduced in all major financial centres.  
 
4.3. Emergency funds of private lenders 
An emergency fund of private lenders could contribute to the solution of debt crises. Such a 
scheme appears to be useful particularly because it would be a private solution: Borrowers 
and lenders would take precautionary measures for the event of a credit crisis. In contrast to 
the current system, in which a public institution, the IMF, is called to the rescue when a crisis 
hits, a private emergency fund would not depend on public money. A similar, but not identical 
proposal has been suggested by George Soros: An insurance should cover the risk of a 
                                                 
24 In early 2000, these collective action clauses made the restructuring of three Ukrainian bonds emitted in 
Luxembourg simple. Another Ukrainian bond emitted in Frankfurt without collective action clauses could only 
be restructured using the sales teams of four investment banks that had to identify each and every single 
bondholder (see IMF 2001).  
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borrower running into trouble and a loan becoming non-performing. Banks and other lenders 
could insure their risk with the payment of a fee (see Noland 1998). The difference between 
an emergency fund and an insurance is that the latter covers a precisely defined case, whereas 
the former would provide a broader safety net.  
 
Although both ideas look promising, their implementation will be difficult, at least on a 
voluntary basis. Such systems would perhaps work immediately after a crisis, but not for a 
long period of time. The longer since the crisis, the lower the incentive to pay the extra cost 
for the insurance or the fund. The arising cost would reduce profits, and there is not a high 
probability that lenders will accept this premium for a long time. Furthermore, the banks’ own 
risk assessment departments would either become obsolete or under-utilised. Finally, such 
schemes would reduce competition between the banks. The ability to assess credit risk better 
than the competition separates stronger from weaker banks. A voluntary credit insurance 
would consequently be more often used by weaker banks, which would result in relatively 
high premiums. These, in turn, would lower the willingness to buy such insurance. 
 
The bottom line is: On a voluntary basis, neither of those schemes is looking attractive. But 
what about a compulsory credit insurance? Theoretically, this would offer a fine alternative. If 
lenders or borrowers would have to prove insurance cover before an international loan 
contract or a bond offer could be implemented, financial markets would be more stable. 
Similar to the compulsory insurance any car has to have that is driven in public space, any 
potentially risky loan or bond would have to be accompanied by a safety net. Such an 
approach is theoretically plausible, but in practise it will be very difficult to implement such a 
scheme. The first problem is that such a compulsory insurance would have to be introduced in 
virtually all important financial markets. In principle, this problem is similar to the difficulties 
the Tobin tax would cause: It is either implemented everywhere, or it will not work. The 
coverage of financial centres that enforce a compulsory insurance would have to be even more 
comprehensive: If, say, the insurance of a $ 1000 million loan would cost one percent per 
annum, this is already a powerful incentive to use another market for the issuance of a bond or 
for signing the loan agreement. The second argument is that the financial sector industry will 
certainly restrict any effort that forces them to insure their business. It is hard to envisage 
support for such schemes from the major banks as well as from other influential players in 
financial markets. 
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From the perspective of a developing country or an emerging market, such schemes are not 
without contradictions. For domestic companies, it would make borrowing abroad more 
expensive than borrowing domestically. On the other hand, it could be argued that from the 
perspective of a developing country’s government such a scheme would be a very positive 
measure since it would both reduce the risk of a credit crisis and make borrowing 
domestically more attractive. However, it appears that other measures that can be 
implemented much more easily, e.g. controls on capital inflows, are the better alternative. 
 
4.4. Capital controls for crisis prevention 
The slow progress with regard to the development of more stable international financial 
markets underlines the need for crisis prevention on a national level. A classic example are 
Chile’s restrictions on capital inflows.25 The aim of these measures is to limit the inflow of 
short-term, so-called hot money which can be withdrawn from a country in a panic. Favouring 
long-term inflows the risk of a sudden withdrawal of capital shall be reduced. 
 
After the severe financial crises of the 1970s and 80s, Chile introduced a universal reserve 
requirement (URR) in 1991. Initially 20, later 30 percent of a credit or a bond from abroad had 
to be deposited free of interest for one year at the central bank. After one year, the reserve was 
handed back. Since the reserve requirement tried to cover more or less all portfolio inflows, 
the government effectively reached two goals: Firstly, short-term inflow were disadvantaged. 
This was the primary effect of the URR: Inflows with a longer maturity, which are 
significantly less dangerous than short-term inflows, were favoured. Secondly, the URR also 
strengthened the domestic financial system. Local banks and other financial intermediaries 
benefited from the URR, which in effect worked like a tax on borrowing abroad. Borrowing 
domestically was made more attractive. 
 
The results of the Chilean policy are convincing. The first observation concerns Chile’s 
economic stability in the 1990s. Despite several financial crisis in the region, Chile was not 
severely hit. The main reason is the changed composition of  capital inflows: In 1989, only 5.0 
percent of inflows had a maturity of more than 12 months. Eight years later this ratio had risen 
to 97.2 percent. This was achieved without decoupling Chile from international financial 
markets: From 1989 to 1997 capital inflows grew from $ 1.52 to $ 2.89 (see Edwards 2000).  
                                                 
25 Another country using similar measures is Slovenia.  
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The coverage of the URR was smaller than expected: Only 40 percent of inflows were subject 
to the URR. Two reasons are responsible for this: Firstly, some inflows, e.g. foreign direct 
investment, were excepted from the URR. Secondly, the regulation showed loopholes (see 
Massad 1998).  
 
Universal reserve requirements are an efficient tool, but they cannot be implemented by all 
developing countries and emerging economies. They work in economies that demonstrate a 
solid economic and fiscal policy and that possess an efficient administration that is able to 
implement these capital controls. However, in economies with an erratic and unstable 
economic and fiscal policy a restriction on inflows cannot provide miracles (see Edwards 
2000, p. 25). Nevertheless, in particular for countries experiencing rapid economic growth 
accompanied by massive inflows of capital, these restrictions on capital inflows offer an 
interesting concept worthwhile exploring.26 
 
4.5. Capital controls for crisis resolution 
Whilst many economists have now accepted limitations of capital inflows as appropriate 
measures to enhance the stability of the economy of a developing country, there is no 
consensus with regard to the use of capital controls to fight financial crises. Many observers 
assume that the introduction of capital controls within a crisis worsens rather than improves 
the situation of a country in trouble. Contrary to this assessment of many, the experience of 
Malaysia gives a divergent perspective. 
 
On 1 September 1998, the Malaysian government introduced comprehensive capital controls. 
These measures were taken more than one year after the Asian crisis had begun. Therefore, 
the mainstream conclusion has been that Malaysia introduced the capital controls far too late 
at a time when the crisis was overcome in any case. Also, it is often said that neighbouring 
Thailand recovered without introducing capital controls: With or without capital controls, 
Malaysia was about to overcome the crisis anyway. 
                                                 
26 In the past, OECD-countries have also used this measure. Germany implemented a URR from March 1972 to 
September 1974. The rapidly growing German economy was suddenly confronted with a massive inflow of 
capital, primarily from oil producing countries. The Bundesbank reacted with the introduction of  the 
“Bardepotpflicht”. However, in the world’s third largest economy the administration of capital inflows proved to 
be rather complex and time-consuming. Also, the economic crisis of 1974 reduced the inflow of capital anyway. 
The reserve requirement was scrapped two-and-a-half years after its introduction (see www.bundesbank.de/lzb-
rs/de/publikation/pdf/festschrift.pdf, November 1997). 
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In contrast to this view, Kaplan and Rodrik have come to a different assessment. The starting 
point of their analysis is to ask whether the situation in Malaysia was indeed about to improve 
anyway. Unexpectedly, the instability on Malaysian financial markets grew in the first eight 
months of 1998. One indicator used is the level of interest rates, which grew for credit in 
offshore markets denominated in Malaysian Ringgit from 6 percent in January 1998 to 23 
percent in August 1998 (see Kaplan/Rodrik 2000, p. 20).  
 
Table 6: Capital controls in Malaysia 
Regulations introduced on 1 September 1998 
Exchange rate Fixing at RM 3.80 per US-Dollar 
Selling/Buying of Ringgit Approval required for non-residents 
Selling/Buying of Ringgit denominated assets All operations have to be made by approved 
domestic intermediaries. This was the effective 
closure of offshore markets for Ringgit 
Exchange of Ringgit held by non-residents in 
external accounts   
Required permission of central bank 
Current account transactions No limitations 
Trade credit Was provided to non-resident exporters of 
Malaysian goods 
Domestic nationals Limit of Ringgit 10.000 per travel abroad  
Foreign nationals Limit of Ringgit 1.000 when leaving the country 
Non-residents Requirement to hold on to investments in 
Malaysian securities for at least 12 months 
Non-resident correspondent banks and 
stockbroking companies 
Ban on the provision of domestic credit  
Changes from 15 February 1999 
Moratorium on repatriation of investments: All 
capital having entered Malaysia before 15 
February 1999 could be repatriated subject to a 
graduated tax on capital 
a) 30% if repatriated within 7 months after 
entering Malaysia; b) 20% if repatriated between 
7 and 9 months c) 10% between 9 and 12 months 
d) no tax if repatriated after one year or later 
Funds entering Malaysia after 15 February Capital was free to enter and leave, but the profits 
were taxed: 30% if repatriated within one year; 
10% after one year 
Source: Kaplan/Rodrik 2000, P. 10. 
 
Against this background, i.e. the measurable increase in instability, the result of the measures 
introduced by Malaysia has to be seen in a different light. The country was not about to 
overcome the crisis anyway, but was able to avoid a further economic slump with the help of 
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capital controls. The exchange rate was stabilised and the domestic interest level could be 
lowered to a level that encouraged domestic investment. Furthermore, the capital controls did 
not affect foreign direct investment or foreign trade (see Kaplan/Rodrik 2000, p. 11).  
 
The controls had an interesting component: The ban on the provision of domestic credit to 
non-resident banks and stockbroking companies had the effect of limiting the possibility of 
speculation against the Ringgit: If speculators cannot borrow in the targeted currency, they are 
not benefiting from a devaluation (see table 6).  
 
The rapid transformation of the ban on the export of capital to a tax was another wise move: It 
effectively reduced the severity of the capital controls less than six months after their 
introduction and replaced them with a graduated tax. Foreigners could subsequently repatriate 
their capital, but a tax incentive was provided to encourage longer periods of investment. An 
important differentiation was also introduced: In the case of capital that had been invested in 
Malaysia before 15 February 1999, the tax was levied on all capital, in the case of capital 
invested after that date only profits were taxed (see table 6).  
 
A further remarkable point is that the capital controls were only used for a short period of 
time. In contrast to early assessments of the IMF, the introduction of capital controls did not 
lead to a de-linking of Malaysia from international capital markets. Malaysia was able to 
return to international capital markets as early as May 1999, less than one year after the 
imposition of the controls. The country successfully placed a bond with a volume of $ 1.0 
billion.  
 
The Malaysian experience shows that capital controls can play an important role in the effort 
to overcome an acute financial crisis (see Eichengreen 1998). Needless to point out that 
capital controls are not a panacea and that they have to be implemented in a thoughtful 
manner. In contrast to capital controls on inflows, which can be used for many years,  these 
emergency measures should probably not be implemented for a long period of time, especially 
in countries which previously had already fully liberalised capital flows.  
 
However, the Malaysian case is an important lesson for the IMF. When the fund was involved 
in formulating a rescue package, the introduction of capital controls never played a role. The 
 49
IMF’s choice always were austerity measures and the use of high interest rates to attract 
foreign capital. This approach has proven to be ineffective and in many cases harmful to the 
affected economy. In contrast to the traditional approach of the IMF, Malaysia has clearly 
demonstrated that there are alternatives.  
 
4.6. Sovereign insolvency and its regulation 
The liberalisation of capital flows has until now not been accompanied by structures at the 
international level that are considered indispensable in national financial markets. One of the 
components missed most is an approach for sovereign debt restructuring to manage the 
bankruptcy of a public borrower. 
 
The idea for an international bankruptcy court is not new at all. In the mid-1980s proposals 
were made for the transformation of national insolvency procedures to the international level 
(see Raffer 1990).  
 
American regulations can be used as a blueprint. In the USA, municipalities can declare 
themselves bankrupt according to Chapter 9 of the US insolvency law. 27 Three conditions 
have to be met: Firstly, the municipality must be insolvent or unable to pay back its debts as 
they mature. Secondly, the municipality must demonstrate the willingness to repay the debt. 
Thirdly, the municipality must either have obtained the support of creditors in each class of 
debt or must have tried unsuccessfully to work out a plan (see Raffer 1990, p. 302).  
 
In an international context a neutral court could be set up to solve the insolvency. The 
arbitrators of the court should be nominated by both creditors and debtors, each party 
providing the same number of members of the court. Out of that group a chairperson should 
be elected, giving him or her the decisive vote (see Raffer 1990, p. 304).  
 
As in national bankruptcy procedures, the aim an international insolvency procedure is to 
enable a fresh start for the heavily indebted country. The partial debt forgiveness shall lead to 
                                                 
27 Although some authors, e.g. Jeffrey Sachs and Thomas Kampffmeyer, have suggested the use of Chapter 11 of 
US bankruptcy law, this not entirely plausible: Chapter 11 is made for private companies, not for territorial 
entities. Chapter 9 is the more feasible approach: It protects the municipalities’ governmental powers. This is the 
main reason why Chapter 9 seems better suited for sovereign borrowers (see Raffer 1990, p. 302).  
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a sustainable level of debt, i.e. an amount of credit that enables the borrower to pay interest 
and redemption.  
 
A number of arguments against such a proposal can be made. One possible criticism is that 
sovereign insolvency is much less important today than it was a decade ago. International 
borrowing is increasingly happening between private lenders and private borrowers, public 
borrowing from non-official source plays an ever-decreasing role. However, this argument 
does not hold water. There are still quite a few countries that are unable to meet their payment 
obligations, for instance quite a few African countries as well as Argentina. Also, past debt 
crises, e.g. in Chile in 1982 or in South Korea in 1997, have seen the socialisation of private 
debt: Governments are regularly forced to take over private debt in order to maintain their 
countries integration into international financial markets. In other words: Debt that was 
private before a crisis often becomes public debt with the subsequent need for orderly debt 
restructuring. Finally, the disciplinary effect of an international bankruptcy procedure should 
not be underestimated. Without such a procedure, lenders could assume that there would be an 
international bail-out. These assumption in turn reduced the willingness for a sober evaluation 
of credit risk.28 
 
After many years of silence on this issue, the IMF surprised the financial world with a far-
reaching proposal. The Deputy Managing Director of the Fund, Anne Krueger, in November 
2001 suggested the creation of an insolvency procedure under IMF leadership. In the 
explanation of the need for such a scheme, Krueger used remarkably blunt language. She 
criticised investors that used aggressive legal tactics to secure their economic advantage. 
Krueger labelled a particular investor as a vulture company. These entrepreneurs, Elliott 
Associates, in 1997 had bought Peruvian credit on secondary markets for $ 20.7 million. In 
October 1995, Peru had declared a restructuring of their debt and had enjoyed IMF support. In 
the course of the debt restructuring, this debt should have been exchanged for Brady bonds.29 
Elliott Associates, however, demanded the payment of the full nominal value of the loans, $ 
56 million, and applied for a enforceable legal document to have Peruvian assets confiscated 
                                                 
28 Raffer supposes that there would never have been a debt crisis in the 1980s if  an international insolvency 
procedure would have been introduced in the 1970s (see Raffer 1990, p. 310). 
29 Brady bonds were developed in 1989. They were created out of restructured bank loans, which were turned 
into bonds, in other words a securitisation of the old bank loans. The name was taken from the then US Minister 
of Finance, Nicolas Brady. Brady bonds in most cases have a long maturity period and different types of interest 
payments.  
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both in the USA and in Belgium. Elliott wanted to seize money that had been earmarked for 
payment to Brady bond holders. The Peruvian government did not have sufficient time to fight 
the already issued enforceable legal documents. The prime concern was the risk that Peru 
would have defaulted on payments of Brady bonds, which would have discredited Peru’s 
already damaged reputation. Against this Background, Peru decided to pay (see Krueger 
2001). 
 
Krueger’s proposals, aptly characterised as a bombshell by the Financial Times, follow the 
concept of an international bankruptcy procedure. Countries with an unmanageable debt 
burden shall, after IMF approval, stop payment of interest and redemption. During this 
standstill period the countries shall, if necessary, use capital controls to avoid capital flight.  
 
Anne Krueger expects the mechanism to have a disciplinary effect on lenders. The sheer 
existence of a procedure to manage the bankruptcy of a sovereign borrower would, in 
Krueger’s opinion, cause a more careful evaluation of risk. If this would lead to a reduction of 
capital flows to developing countries, this would be a welcome side-effect, in particular if this 
reduction would have been caused by improved risk-management (see Krueger 2001). 
 
The proposal is both surprising and welcome. After long hesitation the IMF has accepted that 
regulations are necessary for the bailing-in of creditors in the resolution of financial crisis. 
However, the implementation of this proposal is a distant prospect. The following points have 
to be considered: 
- The proposal requires the change of the IMF’s articles of agreement. Three fifths of the 
member countries and 85 percent of the voting rights are required for such a move. Since 
the USA holds more than 17 percent, this proposal needs American consent. Since this 
change would not be considered a new treaty, there would not be a need for a two thirds 
majority in the US Senate, a simple majority would do.30 However, the House of 
Representatives would also have to pass it.  
- The Krueger proposal will not only require an amendment of the IMF’s articles of 
agreement, but it will also have to be incorporated in national law. This is no small hurdle. 
Krueger herself admits that the necessary limitation of the right of a creditor to take the 
                                                 
30 The underlying international treaty is the “Bretton Woods Agreement Act”, which was passed in 1944 (see 
Kenen 2002, p. 12).  
 52
borrower to court would have to be universal, i.e. world-wide. Otherwise creditors would 
sue borrowers in those countries where legal action would still be possible.  
- When considering the necessary support for the implementation of a bankruptcy court, the 
lack of support in the USA is the biggest hurdle. The American finance minister Paul 
O’Neill has not supported the IMF initiative, but has given preference for a “decentralised, 
market-oriented approach” (Financial Times, 24 April 2002, p. 12). The Bush 
administration prefers collective action clauses, which it considers a substitute for a 
bankruptcy court. Even if the government would support the scheme and would be willing 
to propose legislation, it would have to be passed by Congress. In the current climate, 
characterised by fierce opposition against any multilateral treaty that limits the rights of 
American citizens and companies, it is hard to envisage the necessary majorities on 
Capital Hill.  
- It is yet unclear where the insolvency court is supposed to be located. Krueger sees the 
IMF in the best position, but not all countries might find this increase of power for the 
IMF an attractive perspective. 
- The development of a catalogue of criteria which have to be fulfilled in order to declare a 
country bankrupt is complex. Should this be a universal set of criteria or would preference 
be given to a case-by-case assessment of insolvency? In practice, a uniform catalogue 
would invariably be subject to intense debate: Is the situation already bad enough to 
declare bankruptcy or is a sovereign debtor simply unwilling to mobilise domestic 
resources for debt service? If the consequences of the declaration of bankruptcy are too 
positive, i.e. if the borrower would benefit through substantial debt reductions, this might 
be the trickiest part of the proposal. To avoid moral hazard the easiest solution would be 
the application of the severity of domestic bankruptcy to the international level: If the 
bankruptcy court would have the right to seize assets of the bankrupt sovereign borrower, 
the incentive to ask for the declaration of bankruptcy would very limited indeed. In other 
words: As long as there is no strong disincentive to activate the bankruptcy court, the risk 
of an abuse of this tool cannot be discussed away. To find the right balance between 
criteria that enable an early solution of the problem and criteria that are too strict is a high 
hurdle. 
- During the standstill measures have to be taken that help to avoid a repetition of the 
economic imbalance. Which economic policy is appropriate for this situation? The old 
question of conditionality for IMF lending comes back into the discussion.  
 53
- Finally, the opposition from the financial sector should not be underestimated. The 
introduction of a formal bankruptcy procedure not only introduce an element of the rule of 
law into the relationship between debtors and creditors on the international level, but it 
would also limit the ability of creditors to enforce their claims. It is entirely plausible to 
expect the financial world to oppose such a limitation of their hitherto quite large power. It 
is therefore not surprising to see the vitriolic comments from Wall Street on the Krueger 
proposal.31 
 
The development in the coming years will show whether this proposal will be implemented. 
Anne Krueger has doubts that the IMF member countries will strongly support the proposal. 
Nevertheless, she argues that the introduction of a formal bankruptcy procedure would be a 
price worthwhile to pay for a more stable and therefore more prosperous world economy (see 
Krueger 2001). 
 
A final point on this issue: Considering the difficulties that have to be overcome before these 
procedures could be implemented, the attention might indeed better be focused on other 
measures that can be implemented by a single country a by a regional integration group, e.g. 
UDROP or monetary regionalism. When the substantial hurdles that would have to be 
overcome are observed, and when the current unwillingness of the major players to support 
multilateral regulation is seen, the prospects for these far reaching new regulatory 
arrangements appear to be bleak indeed. 
 
5.  REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
  
Concerning the shaping of the international financial markets, the International Monetary 
Fund still is the most important multilateral institution. Not only in financial crises, but also in 
the process of the further development of financial markets there is no other organisation with 
a comparable importance. Considering the enormous influence the IMF has and taken the 
severe mistakes of the IMF in the recent financial crises into account, it is no surprise that 
many observers are asking for a substantial improvement of the Fund’s performance. The 
latest and perhaps most serious addition to the choir of IMF-critics is Nobel prize winner 
                                                 
31 The Wall Street Journal fiercely attacks the proposal: “Private creditors would have to cope with an even more 
powerful political actor” (The Wall Street Journal, 24 April 2002, p. 10). The IMF is considered to be “a 
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Joseph Stiglitz, who published vitriolic attacks on the work of the Fund (see Stiglitz 2002, 
2001 and 2000).32  
 
The main reasons for criticising the Fund are: 
a) The economic consequences of the IMF’s work are too frequently negative. In particular 
in the Asian crisis the Fund has probably done more harm than good. Instead if helping to 
overcome the crisis, the IMF deepened it (see Dieter 1998; Stiglitz 2002). But failure is 
not limited to the Asian crisis: In other countries, namely the transformation countries, the 
Fund also preferred simple liberalisation strategies which did not deliver good results. 
Most recently, the IMF’s work in Argentina has been called into question: Argentina’s 
unsustainable exchange rate regime was supported far too long.  
b) Although the IMF has been criticising governments in developing countries for the lack of 
transparency in their economies, the Fund itself has been characterised by an extreme lack 
of transparency. The IMF was a “secretive institution” (Jeffrey Sachs). The agreements of 
the Fund with its member countries were not published. The decision making processes 
were obscure. Discussions in the executive board were not published. 
c) The interests of creditors dominated the work of the Fund. The main purpose of IMF 
programmes was to insure repayment of loans and bonds (see Stiglitz 2001, p. 14). The 
IMF has been a creditor cartel that did not give enough consideration to the needs of its 
weaker and less powerful member countries.  
d) The conditionality of the Fund’s programmes was excessive. The countries hit by a 
financial crisis had to implement too many and too detailed conditions. The Managing 
Director of the IMF, Horst Köhler, has taken a very critical position on conditionality.33  
Following some intensive debate after the Asian crisis, the discussion today is somewhat less 
polarised. Very few observers today ask for the closure of the Fund. Also the other extreme, 
the creation of some sort of a global central bank, is not often proposed any more. There has 
been significant progress with regard to the IMF’s transparency: Today both the Fund’s 
programmes as well as the internal discussions can be followed on its homepage. However, as 
the heated discussion following the publication of Joseph Stiglitz’ latest book shows, there are 
                                                                                                                                                        
bureaucracy in search of a new missions. The bankruptcy court is only the latest, and among the worst” (ibid.).  
32 Martin Wolf has supported some of the criticism in Stiglitz latest book. Both the IMF standard policy to raise 
interest rates and the big bailouts orchestrated by the IMF also find Wolf’s disagreemnt. He argues that the 
bottom line in the evaluation of the Fund’s work is not the quality of the rhetoric of the IMF’s officials, but the 
economic success. And there the record is not looking good (see Financial Times, 10 July 2002, p. 19).  
 55
still enough issues that need further analysis and there is a lot of room for improvement in the 
work of the Fund.34 
 
5.1 Crisis prevention: Is surveillance sufficient? 
Crisis prevention has become one of the new areas of work for the Fund. After the IMF, as 
virtually everybody else, did not see the Asian crisis coming, there now is an attempt to 
improve the forecasting capacity of the Fund as well as its ability to stabilise an economy 
before a financial crisis breaks out. Horst Köhler in particular tries to focus the Fund’s work 
on crisis prevention.  
 
Apart from the fact that crisis prevention has always been a central element of the IMF’s 
mandate, the focus on crisis prevention has an immediate appeal, at least at first.35 But at 
closer inspection, the tools that shall be used to prevent financial crises from developing 
appear to be too weak. The Fund emphasises that better transparency and an improved 
surveillance of the development in financial markets would be sufficient. In other words: The 
Fund assumes that a better knowledge of financial flows and of debt levels will be sufficient 
to avoid severe financial crises.  
 
The first problem here is: There are no reliable forecasting models available. Either too many 
financial crises are predicted that never happen or the models are not able to detect even major 
crises. Prognosis that can be used by policy makers is not available. Frenkel and Menkhoff 
have emphasised that the Asian crisis would not have been predicted even by the most 
elaborate models (see Frenkel/Menkhoff 2000, p. 29).  
 
A number of reasons are responsible for this dilemma. Firstly the forecasting potential of the 
indicators used is limited. For instance, we do not exactly know which level of foreign 
borrowing has to be considered unsustainable. Secondly, we are confronted with the 
continuous emergence of new types of financial crises, which makes forecasting difficult. 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 In a speech delivered to three parliamentary committees of the German Bundestag in April 2001, Köhler 
identified the reform of conditionality as one of the greatest challenges to the Fund.  
34 The Chief Economist of the IMF, Kenneth Rogoff, chastised Stiglitz’ bitterly for his book. In an open letter, 
Stiglitz was accused, amongst other things, for his criticism of the former Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, 
Stanley Fischer (see www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2002/070202.htm).  
35 In Article IV, Section 3 of the IMF’s Articles of agreement, this focus can already be found: “…the Fund shall 
exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of its members” 
(www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa04.htm#3, emphasis added).  
 56
Thirdly, the crises themselves produce a new situation, which complicates prognosis (see 
Frenkel/Menkhoff 2000, p. 32f). The IMF has looked at the issue and has concluded that one 
should not expect too much from currently available forecasting models. Some of them would 
provide valuable insights, but would at the same time often cause false alarm (see Berg/Patillo 
2000).  
 
Looking at the problems the private companies in the financial sector have faced illustrates the 
problem. The American hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) had amongst 
the members of the board two Nobel Prize winners, Robert Merton and Myron Scholes. 
LTCM not only used very complex models to speculate with derivatives, but also employed a 
sophisticated system of risk management. Despite presumably cautious assumptions, the 
system proved to be inadequate: In September 1998, LTCM was insolvent (see Dunbar 2000, 
p. 190).  
 
As long as we do not have reliable forecasting models, the better surveillance of financial 
markets will not be able to make a significant contribution to improved crisis prevention.  
 
Furthermore, one has to ask what the IMF ought to do if it would see a financial crisis coming 
that has so far been ignored by financial markets. A range of options would be available to the 
Fund, but none of them is convincing and all have severe side-effects. 
 
a) The Fund could warn publicly that a financial crisis in country A is likely to happen. This 
in turn could lead to a panic on financial markets. Each player in the market would then 
have a motive to withdraw his money from that market, which has officially been declared 
dangerous. Some pension fund managers might even have to liquidate their investment in 
a particular economy once those heavy warnings have been issued by the IMF. With an 
early public warning a situation might be created that would not have emerged had the 
IMF not publicly warned.  
b) The Fund could warn the affected government secretly and recommend a tightening of 
economic policy. But this is also not an easy option: Which instruments should be used if 
the IMF diagnosis is that a country with a booming economy borrows to much abroad? 
For instance, should the government in the affected country raise interest rates? As long as 
capital markets remain open, raising domestic interest rates in an economic boom may 
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further destabilise the situation, because banks and private borrowers then have an 
additional incentive to borrow abroad, rather than domestically. If, on the other hand, the 
government would lower interest rates, this would fuel the boom even further and could 
easily lead to a situation where inflation becomes a severe problem.  
c) The IMF could directly warn certain market participants. But the problem here is that the 
IMF cannot limit the dissemination of economically relevant information to a limited 
circle of market participants, since they would then have an unfair competitive advantage. 
d) The IMF could regularly evaluate credit risk and could publish the results of his findings. 
This would mean that the IMF has become an agency for the evaluation of credit risk. In 
that case the cancellation of any public financial support for the Fund would have to be 
demanded, because these services can be supplied by private rating agencies. There would 
not be a need for an additional, publicly funded monitoring body.  
 
Early warning systems are neither easy to construct nor is it clear what ought to be done in the 
event of a looming crisis. The experience with the currently existing models shows the 
problems associated with forecasting. The bet on early warning systems only is a risky 
strategy. Better knowledge of developments on financial is useful, but not sufficient.  
 
5.2. IMF conditionality: Too much or not enough?  
The IMF has already changed its position on conditionality. Since September 2000, the so 
called Interim Guide on Streamlining Conditionality is used. In the past, the IMF forced the 
adoption of conditions that had nothing to do with the acute financial crisis. Instead, creditor 
countries used the opportunity to ask the debtors countries for changes of their national 
economic policies. These conditions were regarding questions of market opening, but also of 
human rights or environmental affairs. The American Congress in particular used 
“Congressional Directives” to influence the work of the Fund. But these attempts to abuse the 
Fund’s position in a financial crisis were not limited to the official side. Non-governmental 
organisations also used the IMF and financial crises for the promotion of their specific 
agendas.  
 
This is a perilous point. For instance, the argument has been presented that a conditionality 
demanding democratic reform and the implementation of human rights is good for the 
affected country, because it promotes stability and in the long run this will promote economic 
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prosperity. Although this might be possible in some cases, as a general rule it appears to be 
mislead, for it ignores one of the main conclusions of development co-operation. Reforms 
have to be developed in the affected country, they cannot be imposed on a society. Country 
ownership, as the World Bank calls it, is central to any successful and sustainable reform 
programme. All measures have to fit the societal and historic context of an economy. The 
people in the affected countries know best where the weaknesses and where the strengths of 
their societies lie. They know which elements of a reform package might be politically to 
sensitive and which might lead to an unwanted de-stabilisation of society.  
 
The reform of IMF conditionality has not been completed yet. It appears likely that the list of 
conditions for an IMF programme will become shorter. A simple test will make the choice of 
conditionality easier: Would a larger OECD-country be forced to accept the same 
conditions?36 
 
5.3. The IMF as a lender-of-last-resort 
Apart from crisis prevention, the management of financial crises continues to be the second 
pillar of IMF-activities. The lower number of conditions belong to this task. The most 
important point, however, is the provision of liquidity in a crisis. In future crises, should the 
Fund provide liquidity faster and more generously than in the past?  
 
After the Asian crisis, the Fund has created new instruments in particular for liquidity crises. 
The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF)  was introduced in1997, followed by the Contingent 
Credit Lines (CCL) in 1999. SRF is a credit facility that can be used by countries that are 
confronted with an unexpected disruption in the markets (“a sudden and disruptive loss of 
market confidence”) that leads to a current account crisis. The SRF can only be used by 
countries that implement measures which are considered by the IMF as strengthening the 
confidence of markets.37 The CCL are supposed to work as a defence shield against so called 
contagion effects from financial crises in other countries. The provision of liquidity shall help 
to reduce the spreading of a crisis. Pre-qualification is compulsory.38  
                                                 
36 Martin Feldstein has suggested this type of conditionality testing soon after the Asian crisis (see Feldstein 
1998).  
37 SRF credit has a maturity of 12 to 30 months. The interest rate is the basic rate of the IMF plus a spread of 3 to 
5 percent (see IMF Survey Supplement, Vol. 30, September 2001, p. 12).  
38 The interest rate charged on CCL credit is lower than on SRF. (see IMF Survey Supplement, Vol. 30, 
September 2001, p. 12).  
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The importance of these aspects is underlined when the recent financial crises are more 
carefully considered. At least some of these financial crises were deepened, if not caused, by a 
sudden squeeze of liquidity. The affected economies were temporary illiquid, but not 
insolvent. South Korea was such a case. After the provision of liquidity the economy 
recovered rapidly, a V-shaped development of the crisis. In such cases, the delayed provision 
of liquidity leads to an avoidable deterioration of the economic situation. In the same context, 
the already mentioned rapid reactions of the big central banks after September 11 underline 
how important the provision of liquidity is if an unwarranted panic on financial markets shall 
be avoided.  
 
If one agrees that liquidity should be provided faster and more generously, it has to be asked 
in what form this liquidity should be provided. Three options are available: 
 
a) As in the past, the IMF could provide fresh liquidity only up to a certain, pre-set level and 
could ask for the implementation of conditions. 
b) Alternatively, the IMF could provide liquidity if countries have pre-qualified. This is the 
approach chosen for the CCL. The problem is that up to now no country has applied for 
the CCL.39 
c) The third possible solution would be to expand the IMF and to turn it into a global lender 
of last resort. In this case, member countries could go to the IMF and could draw liquidity 
without limitations and conditions (see Fischer 2000). 
 
The third option is both the most radical as well as the simplest option. It would create in the 
international field an institution that is considered indispensable: One function of central 
banks is to operate as national lenders of last resort.40 
 
In the 19th century, Walter Bagehot has defined what a lender of last resort should do: It 
should lend freely, at penalty rates, against good collateral (see Fischer 2000, p. 9). In an 
                                                 
39 One can only speculate why member countries have not yet applied. An important aspect most probably is that 
financial markets may already interpret the application of a country for CCL as a sign of a looming financial 
crisis. Instead of strengthening a country, CCL might lead an economy into turmoil in financial markets. 
Therefore the British government has demanded an improvement of CCL conditions to make their use more 
attractive (Financial Times, 30 November 2001, p. WE 2).  
40 Of course, the IMF can by definition not become a true lender of last resort. This would require the Fund to be 
able to create liquidity, which it cannot. However, a Fund that has substantial resources at its disposal can operate 
as a quasi lender of last resort. In practice, this differentiation might not be of great importance.  
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international context, economies would gain access to liquidity if they would be willing to pay 
interest rates above market rates and if they would be able to provide collateral with a 
marketable value. 
 
Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF until summer 2001, has 
highlighted the need for liquidity in a financial crisis and has underlined the need to 
understand the dynamic of a financial crisis. In an economy with an open capital account, the 
national central bank cannot provide the foreign currency that is needed by both the public and 
the private sector, because even a well equipped central bank only has limited foreign 
reserves. In such a situation, only an international lender of last resort can help. 
 
Fischer explains his call for the creation of an international lender of last resort with the 
increasing volatility of international capital flows and with contagion effects that could be 
witnessed during the past crises. The instability of international financial markets caused by 
unfounded panic can, so Fischer argues, be eliminated by the existence of an international 
lender of last resort (see Fischer 2000, p. 16).  
 
Fischer’s remarks are interesting for a number of reasons. At the end of his work at the IMF 
Fischer has admitted that capital flows are volatile and that there are contagion effects: 
Financial crises do affect countries that coincidentally are located in a specific region struck 
by a crisis or, even less predictable, that are considered to lie in the same category, e.g. are an 
emerging market. While such an assessment is not new for many observers of recent financial 
crises, for Stanley Fischer it is. In particular in the Asian crisis he continued to argue that the 
main reasons for the crisis are to be found in the countries themselves, not in the behaviour of 
players on financial markets.  
 
The implementation of the proposal to create an international lender of last resort, however, is 
complicated for conceptual as well as for political reasons. The least complicated issue is the 
level of interest that has to be found: It has to be above the pre-crisis level, but below the level 
that commercial banks are charging in the height of the crisis. 
 
Much more complicated is the provision of adequate collateral. For an international lender of 
last resort the identification of collateral that has a marketable value is not easy. For instance, 
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the level of future export earnings cannot be estimated easily. Exports of raw materials are the 
easiest option. There exists an example for such a procedure: In the Mexican bailout in 1995, 
the country had to give its future earnings from the export of crude oil as collateral.  
 
Even if the identification of sufficient collateral would be possible, another point requires 
clarification: What will be done if the temporary liquidity crisis turns into a permanent 
solvency crisis? The international lender of last resort would then have to have to right to 
draw on the collateral. For such a proceeding, the existence of an international bankruptcy 
court or another institutionalised procedure would be necessary. 
 
Apart from these conceptual problems enormous political obstacles would have to be 
overcome. If the IMF would be transformed into an international lender of last resort, this 
would constitute a major change in the character of the institution. The Fund would be 
converted into a co-operative bank in which the smaller stakeholders would have far reaching 
rights for the use of liquidity. The political influence of the larger OECD-countries and the US 
in particular would be reduced, because IMF lending could no longer be used to gain political 
and economic concessions from the country in financial distress. The Fund would be an 
institution that its member countries can use in the event of a crisis without having to 
surrender their sovereignty.  
 
Although there is currently a greater tendency to shape international financial markets in a  
more impartial way than in the 1990s, the transformation of the IMF into a lender of last resort 
might be too much for most IMF countries. It would require that substantial amounts of 
money are transferred to the Fund and subsequently to member countries in trouble without 
conventional conditionality applying. For many governments this will be unacceptable simply 
because an abuse of these credit lines can, by definition, not be ruled out. 
 
Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective the call for an international lender of last resort is 
consistent: If capital controls are scraped and capital movements are liberalised, central banks 
loose important instruments that have to be provided at a global level. Consequently, one can 
argue that as long as there is no international lender of last resort, capital controls should 
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continuously be used.41 Developing countries and emerging markets in particular should not 
completely liberalise capital flows into and out of their economies.  
 
At the same time, the problems that are associated with the transformation of the IMF into a 
lender of last resort force groups of countries to develop their own regional liquidity funds. In 
particular East Asian countries have both increased their own reserves as well as started to 
develop a regional liquidity fund (see Dieter 2000; Dieter/Higgott 2002; Kim/Ryou/Wang 
2000). Although the implementation of a regional liquidity fund is confronted with both 
economic and political problems in East Asia, the underlying idea remains valid: Every 
financial system needs a lender of last resort, whether its a regional or a global one. 
 
 
6.  THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM 
 
Apart from the IMF there are numerous other organisations discussing a reform of the 
international financial architecture. Unlike others the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has 
gained both prominence and relevance. 
 
The FSF was created in 1999 by the former President of the German Bundesbank, Hans 
Tietmeyer, one of the most prominent European central bankers. In the FSF, representatives of 
the G-7 countries, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the IMF, the World Bank, the 
OECD and other institutions exchange views and discuss possible reform. The first question 
is why this organisation was founded. 
 
The regulation of financial markets continues to be primarily a national affair. However, the 
high degree of internationalisation of financial markets results in a need for co-ordinated 
regulation. In the FSF, proposals for regulation are discussed before implementation. 
Although the FSF has no decision making capacity and a weak mandate, it is a useful 
organisation. The soft institutional structure is required to enable co-ordination without strict 
sanctions. The FSF is a useful addition for the work of the Fund and national regulatory 
authorities.  
                                                 
41 In the absence of a global lender of last resort, rollover options can provide a partial substitute. See the section 
on rollover options. 
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Table 7: Members of the FSF 
Members Number 
G-7 countries with 3 representatives each (Finance ministry, 
central bank, supervising authority 
21 
Other financial centres with one representative each 
(Australia, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Singapore) 
4 
IMF and World Bank with two representatives each 4 
BIS and OECD one representatives each 2 
International regulatory authorities (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS) 
with two representatives each 
6 
Central bank experts (CGFS, CPSS) one each 2 
Chairperson ad personam: Andrew Crockett 1 
Source: Frenkel/Menkhoff 2000, p. 42; homepage of the FSF (www.fsforum.org).  
 
The importance of the FSF has been underlined by the choice of chairperson, Andrew 
Crockett, who has gained a remarkable reputation as head of the BIS. The three working 
groups of the FSF have addressed the main problems that international financial markets face: 
hedge funds, offshore financial centres and international capital flows. 
 
The discussion in the FSF on hedge funds has been extensive. What are these secretive 
investment vehicles? Hedge funds are institutions that collect investment capital from wealthy 
individuals as well as from institutional investors. Hedge funds aggressively manage these 
assets. In contrast to other investment funds that offer their services to a wide range of clients, 
hedge funds are not supervised by official authorities.  
 
The first hedge fund was created in 1949 in the US. After the Great Depression investment 
funds were strictly supervised. An exception was made for funds that would service less than 
100 investors and that would not advertise. Alfred Winslow Jones was the first who used this 
loophole in US regulation. The name was derived from the strategy employed: The portfolio 
not only contained shares that were considered to be particularly valuable, but also selling 
options for shares that were considered to be overpriced. This strategy resulted in the 
provision of a safety net in the event of a slump in the stock market – the fund was hedged 
(see Dunbar 2000, p. 120). 
 64
In the 1990s, hedge funds gained doubtful prominence by speculative attacks on currencies, 
for instance against the Pound in 1992. By forcing the depreciation of the Pound, the Quantum 
fund, managed by George Soros, is supposed to have made a profit of $ 2 billion. The bill was 
paid by British taxpayers, who were forced to finance the unsuccessful defence staged by the 
Bank of England.  
 
The mechanism has been simple: Soros and other speculators borrowed extensively in Pound 
sterling, exchanged these into Deutsche Mark and expected that, upon maturity of the loans, 
they would be able to pay these back with fewer Deutsche Mark. Whatever remained was their 
profit. By changing Pounds into Mark, the downward pressure on the Pound was increased. 
The strategy is not only very profitable, but also free of risk: If the Pound would not have been 
devalued, the speculators could have simply paid back their loans. All they risked was the 
differential between borrowing in Pounds and credit interest for Deutsche Mark. 
 
Evidently, hedge funds are of great importance for the stability of the international financial 
system. Primarily, this is caused by the fact that hedge fund frequently are market makers, i.e. 
they do not only passively benefit from a given development of the market, but instead they 
actively push the market in the desired direction.  
 
Supervising institutions realised the dangers that hedge funds cause during the collapse of the 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)  in 1998. LTCM had, with capital of less than $ 5 
billion, borrowed more than $ 125 billion and built up positions in derivatives markets of 
more than $ 1250 billion (see Huffschmid 1999, p. 93; Dunbar 2000, p. 190). The sheer 
volume of these positions could have had a systemic effect, i.e. the international financial 
system was in danger because of the collapse of LTCM. It was therefore not surprising that 
the American Federal Reserve Bank immediately orchestrated a privately financed bailout for 
LTCM. 
 
The FSF’s working group on hedge funds suggested ten measures that should reduce the 
negative influence of hedge funds. However, the obvious recommendation of putting hedge 
funds under the regulatory umbrella of national supervision, was not made. Instead, an 
improvement of transparency and greater openness should provide the same results. The 
working group also suggested an improvement of the risk management of lending banks, an 
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improvement of the risk management of the hedge funds themselves and a strengthening of 
banking supervision specifically for those banks that provide hedge funds with credit (FSF 
2000). 
 
However, the practicability of some proposals remains limited. For instance, it is suggested 
that hedge funds shall in the future report on their activities. The question is: How can a hedge 
fund registered in the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands be forced to follow these 
recommendations? In the past, it was a major advantage of  hedge funds that they were not 
required to provide a report available to the public. A documentation of the strategies 
followed would reduce the main advantage of hedge fund, i.e. it would take away their 
cover.42 
 
In 2002, hedge funds continue to represent a threat to the international financial system. A 
rather new trends is the increase of the spectrum of hedge fund investors. More and more 
pension funds, large commercial banks and insurance companies are becoming hedge funds’ 
customers. Also, commercial banks advertise the use of hedge funds as investment vehicles. 
This is a worrying trend: If hedge funds gain access to more capital, they also have more 
leverage, and that makes the situation dangerous. The FSF should monitor this trend closely. 
The FSF has also made proposals regarding the speculation against currencies. This is another 
non-starter. Why should hedge fund managers follow “good practice guidelines for foreign 
exchange trading”? Speculation against currencies has proved to be one of the most profitable 
businesses, and why should hedge fund managers give that up? Speculation against currencies 
can be very painful for the affected countries, but there is no solution for the ethical 
contradiction: The greater the drama, the bigger the profit for the hedge fund. In 2001, the 
guidelines were made somewhat more precise. The FSF acknowledged that manipulative 
practices in currency trading exist and that these were not acceptable (see FSF 2001). But 
without strict sanctions these recommendations are not worth anything. However, an 
important recommendation is given to the governments of developing countries and emerging 
markets: They should take precautionary measures, including capital controls. 
 
In 2001, the FSF published a report on the progress that has been reached in the process of 
implementation. Some details are worth mentioning. So called macro funds, speculating on 
                                                 
42 It is only due to the collapse of LTCM that we know a bit more about hedge funds’ activities. 
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certain macroeconomic developments, have lost importance. Both George Soros’ Quantum 
fund as well as Julian Roberts’ Tiger fund have either been closed or have changed their 
strategy. The simple reason was bad performance. The Tiger fund alone lost two thirds of 
capital between 1998 and 2000 (see FSF 2002).43 
 
Also interesting is the fact that the ratio of capital to borrowing is sinking. In 1999, hedge 
funds borrowed 232 per cent of own capital, in 2000 this figure was reduced to 168 per cent 
(see FSF 2001). 
 
The FSF’s working group on offshore financial centres has taken a remarkably clear position. 
Offshore financial centres were branded as loopholes of the international financial system that 
made both the supervision of markets more difficult and created the risk of a collapse of the 
international financial system (FSF 2000). However, the recommendations of the working 
group are significantly less convincing than the preceding analysis. Similar to the rather vague 
approach of the working group on hedge funds, the closure of offshore financial centres is not 
recommended. Instead, greater transparency and better reporting are supposed to have the 
same effect.  
 
September 11 has had a greater effect on the willingness of larger players to regulate the 
offshore financial centres than any of the economic crises. In summer 2001, the Bush 
administration objected to any measures against offshore financial centres. Secretary of 
Treasury Paul O’Neill denied that there was any need to interfere in the national regulatory 
approaches and objected to US participation in the OCED “Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering” (FATF).44 
 
Any attempts to stabilise the international financial system can by undermined by offshore 
financial centres in  important fields, e.g. banking supervision. Consequently, these financial 
centres should be banned. The existing campaign against offshore financial centres should be 
                                                 
43 Between 1992 and 1998, the capital of hedge funds had increased 15-fold (see Dunbar 2000, p. 123).  
44 Joseph Stiglitz criticised this behaviour. Both O’Neill and his predecessor Larry Summers demanded more 
transparency from developing countries, whilst they protected at the same time the business of offshore financial 
centres as well as of hedge funds (Joseph Stiglitz, Sicherheit vor Terroranschlägen beginnt zuerst im eigenen 
Land, Handelsblatt, 10 October 2001, p. 10).  
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intensified.45 One possible methods has been suggested by the German finance minister Hans 
Eichel: National supervising authorities should sanction the co-operation with banks from 
offshore centres (see Financial Times, 7 February 2002, p. 11).  
 
Although many offshore centres are in small, independent territories, this is not always the 
case. Quite a few countries that have been listed by the OECD are under British or American 
administration or influence, e.g. the British Virgin Islands, the US Virgin Islands, the Isle of 
Man, Gibraltar, Jersey, Guernsey Sark & Alderley or a country like Panama have to be named 
here (see Financial Times, 26 June 2000, p. 16). 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS: A NEW ORDER FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
 
For too long the call for a better regulation of international financial markets did not receive 
much attention. In virtually all OECD-countries deregulation and liberalisation enjoyed 
support. Financial markets in particular were left to themselves. This, however, was wrong: 
The internationalisation of financial markets is calling for the implementation of regulations 
that exist in all national markets at the global level. One example is the creation of an 
international lender of last resort, another the rules-based baling-in of creditors in the event of 
a financial crisis. 
 
The shaping of globalisation is a task for the political sphere. It is unrealistic to expect 
markets to do this job. The governments of European Union countries in particular should 
accept this responsibility and should push a new order for international financial markets. The 
EU could play an important role in this field. The absence of a common policy in international 
financial affairs is, after the successful introduction of the Euro, much more obvious than 
before. Since many years, Europe is speaking with one voice in the area of international trade. 
This common policy partly explains why the EU has such a strong position in shaping the 
agenda on international trade. What a contrast to finance: Europe is hardly heard, primarily 
because it speaks with many voices.  
 
                                                 
45 Some European governments have already taken this approach. In 2001, the then French finance minister 
Laurent Fabius called for the strict regulation of hedge funds and offshore centres during the annual meeting of 
the G-20 (See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 November 2001, p. 9). 
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What interest would the EU have in a more stable international financial system? Two reasons 
are obvious: Firstly is the EU the world’s biggest trading power. Europe suffers more than 
other players from turbulence in international trade caused by financial crises. Relatively 
stable exchange rates and financial markets facilitate trade in goods and services. Secondly, 
the eastern enlargement of the EU will increase the risk of financial crises within the EU 
itself. A number of the transformation countries that will join appear vulnerable already. An 
international order that helps to avoids financial crises is therefore in the interest of the EU. 
However, until today the EU has not been willing to face this challenge. 
 
Finding an international consensus an a new order will be difficult, mainly because the 
financial industry is unlikely to give up profitable opportunities without resistance. Just one 
example: Floating exchange rates enable banks to offer insurance against volatility. 
Companies can hedge their future earnings, but for this service the banks charge their clients. 
If exchange rates would be stabilised, banks would loose an important source of profit. 
 
The USA continues to view most proposals for improved regulation with explicit reservations. 
Although the approach to some issues, e.g. to improve measures against money laundering, 
has changed, the big picture remains the same. By and large, the US does not support any 
measures that limit the ability of their financial sector to expand to other parts of the world. It 
appears entirely unrealistic to expect an American initiative for the re-regulation of 
international financial markets. Even the latest scandals on Wall Street, from Enron to 
WorldCom and Merck, will probably not affect the position of the Bush administration on the 
regulation of international markets. Some tightening of rules can be expected at the national 
level, but that is not what developing countries do need.  
 
East Asian countries will not push an initiative for a new order in finance. Japan is too 
preoccupied with the solution of its own chronic financial crisis. Unable to sort out its own 
debacle, Japan is also not a shining example for other countries and therefore not destined to 
claim leadership in this field. All other players in East Asia, China included, simply lack the 
weight and influence that is required for the suggested reform. 
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If the EU were able to push the re-shaping of financial globalisation, this could be an element 
of a fairer world economic order that many have called for after September 11. No other 
player in world affairs is as qualified for this non-military leadership task as the EU.46 
 
The project of establishing a new order in international finance is politically challenging. The 
resistance against such a project will undoubtedly be enormous. The financial sectors that 
have grown so dramatically in the last decade will not doubt oppose such an attempt. On the 
other hand, millions of people would benefit, and not only those in countries directly affected 
by financial crises. A reduction of the number and depth of financial crisis with their negative 
effect on the growth of the world economy would be beneficial to most countries.  
 
                                                 
46 This position is shared by Peter Sutherland, former GATT Director General and now Chairman of BP. He 
claimed that in the process of developing global governance, the EU has to meet the challenge: “... the Europeans 
are very much in the frontline – geopolitically, politically, morally” (International Herals Tribune, 8. November 
2001, p. 6).  
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